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JPRS-WER-84-102

21 August 1984

West Europe Report

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ARMS CONTROL FINLAND

YOUTH ATTITUDES ON NUCLEAR WAR, USSR, U.S. THREAT

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 15 Jul 84 p 7

[Unsigned article: "Aggression Researchers Get Together: Finns Believe Nuclear War Will Break Out"]

[Text] People's attitudes toward nuclear war were the most important topic during the concluding day of the congress of the International Society for Research on Aggression (ISRA) on Saturday in Turku.

At the congress, among other things, research done in Finland and the United States was presented which explains notions about the possibility of nuclear war.

Sixty-six percent of those who answered a research questionnaire made by Lea Pulkkinen of Jyvaskyla believed that a nuclear conflict will take place somewhere on the globe during the next ten years. Women were more pessimistic than men. Young people believed more strongly than older people in the outbreak of nuclear war.

Not Prepared for Nuclear War

Nearly 90 percent of those who responded were of the opinion that a nuclear war cannot be won. Very few had made preparations for a nuclear conflict.

Roughly half of those who answered had personally participated in activity opposing nuclear war, by taking part in peace events or by signing appeals for the preservation of peace. Over 90 percent supported a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries.

United States More Inclined to Wage War

According to the research, the United States is seen as more disposed to nuclear war than the Soviet Union. Thirty-three percent of those who responded felt that the United States is the leading military power, while 21 percent considered the Soviet Union stronger.

Over 70 percent were of the opinion that the U.S. government is not doing all it can to prevent nuclear war. Approximately half thought the same thing about the Soviet Union's government and one quarter about Finland's government.

The research was conducted this year in Jyvaskyla. Taking part were 493 respondents.

Answer Depended on Knowledge

According to the research done in Los Angeles, the attitude toward nuclear arms is strongly dependent on the respondent's knowledge and on how the respondent relates to children. If the respondent took a contemptuous view of the opponents of nuclear war, as a rule he also believed that winning a nuclear war is possible.

Over 150 researchers from different countries participated in the sixth congress of the International Society for Research on Aggression. Considerable numbers of participants from socialist countries were present for the first time.

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CSO: 3617/197

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OFFICIAL EAST BLOC DELEGATES IN EUROPEAN PEACE CONFERENCE

Paris LIBERATION in French 21-22 Jul 84 p 16

[Article by Andre Vermont: "Perugia, Capital of the European Peace Movement"]

[Text] After Berlin '83, Perugia '84. This medieval Italian city is now hosting the annual meeting of the European peace movement. Two new elements: the presence of an "official" Soviet peace delegation and the importance attached to problems of the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

The voluminous files which they carry under their arms single them out at first glance from the stream of tourists who every summer invade the capital of the Umbria region. They proceed placidly from a workshop on armament industry, held in a Romanesque church, to a forum devoted to a conference on peace in the Mediterranean held in the large auditorium of the town's main movie theater. They stroll through the narrow medieval streets of the old city, lounge about in sidewalk cafes. A multicolor streamer hangs among the scaffolding surrounding the old cathedral.

From the 17th to the 23rd of July, Perugia has become the capital of the European peace movement. One could almost say that it has become a "world" capital. There are British delegates from the END [expansion unknown] movement, Germans from the Green Party and representatives of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), of the French CODENE, the Italian Peace Committee and so on. There are prominent figures such as the English writer Ken Coats and former President Echevarria of Mexico who is attending for the first time; a Chinese delegate and even a representative of the PLO.

It is not merely due to its impressive setting that the Third European Conference of the Peace Movement contrasts with the one which was held last year in Berlin. This time, "official" peace committees from the east bloc countries, the USSR in particular, have agreed to participate. The organizers consider them as full-fledged members. Which did not stop these organizers from also inviting some 60 "dissidents" or independent peacefighters from the eastern bloc. Of these only two Hungarians—one of them former Premier Hegedus—were issued travel visas. The proceedings opened with 59 vacant

seats and to the sound of loud booing from a large group of delegates who in the presence of embarrassed Soviet representatives were protesting on behalf of their "absent friends." The Soviet delegates threatened to walk out of the conference "if that type of provocation was repeated."

The tone was set. For the vast majority of the Italian and French members of the peace movement and for a group of British and Germans, the Perugia Conference represents, above all, an opportunity to assert that the struggle for peace is inseparable from the struggle for human rights. Dissident expatriates came in large numbers: the Czechs of the Charter 77 group, the Poles of the KOR [Workers Defense Committee] (Solidarity refused to attend due to the presence of a Peace Committee representing the Polish regime). This was a change for both ideas to give concrete shape to a dialogue initiated in recent years despite many a misunderstanding. A joint document signed by Charter 77, the KOR and some German Greens and Italian pacifists was presented on 20 July. It says in particular: "For us peace means more than just the absence of war. For us peace also implies freedom to express one's opinions, freedom of assembly and freedom of movement, full implementation of democratic rights in the political and tradeunionist spheres. Every single violation of human rights, wherever it may happen, is a threat to peace."

The contradictions between the various trends within the European peace movement are sharply revealed in Perugia. What can be done about those East bloc delegates who are busy distributing their badges (a Russian doll holding a dove in its arms), meticulously participating in every committee, pretending not to see the dissidents rubbing shoulders with them? There are peacefighters who support "peace at any cost", mainly those from the Nordic countries, and who think that the Soviet change of attitude, barely a year after Berlin, represents a victory.

The rest, however, feel slightly uncomfortable. But with shades of difference. Some stress that the mere fact of seeing East block officials side by side with dissidents will make future reprisals against independent peacefighters more difficult to carry out. But many Italian delegates—those who are not too influenced by the Communist Party—delegates from France and even from England and Germany hold a different view. Marco Boato, for instance, says: "It is a good thing that they have come to discuss. But they should be looked upon as what they are, which is representatives of their government, and not as representatives of the peace movement."

The statements made by the Soviet delegates during a press conference seem to support that view. A group of six apparachiks representing, among others, peace committees of women, scientists and students, held the press conference in a small classroom jammed full and located right above the school auditorium where the Charter 77 group was presenting at the very same time its "open letter" to the peace movements. The walls were covered with posters of many shapes and colors with "Mir-Peace" written in cyrillic characters.

Two delegates, Silin and Lokshin, spoke in turn explaining the great vigor of the peace movement in the Soviet Union: "A citizens' movement in a peaceloying country." It is a charicature. Questions started in an aggressive tone and without mincing words. What about the independent peacefighters who have been arrested? "In the Soviet Union nobody is jailed for activities in defense of peace." What about the Trust pacificts and Olga Medvedvoka? "They were arrested for their hooliganism and for violating the Soviet laws." Do you agree with the fact that peace and human rights are inseparable? For a second Mr Lokshin hesitates, lights another Winston cigarette and says emphatically: "Certainly, but one must not forget that the world is divided into two political systems which also have different concepts of human rights. But neither one nor the other must be used as an excuse to resume the cold war." He was asked about Afghanistan: "We are there at the request of a legitimate government to fight against bandits and mercenaries." He even said that the position of the government and the position of the peace committees always coincide because in the Soviet Union "it is the people's views which shape the government's views." At the back of the room peacefighters were waving signs opposing missiles in the East and against the arrest of dissidents. There were shouts of 'Sakharow, Sakharov.' "He is Reagan's spokesman in the Soviet Union; he is the one who made the first nuclear bomb," one of the Soviet delegates answered with indignation. He denounced "these false pacifists who want to put obstacles to mutual understanding among peoples." He also denounced "the entire Western media which gives unworthy and biased information, which fosters ignorance, hatred and lies." Two hours of stormy debate which would lead a Soviet delegate to whisper: "It is hard to face the real world."

Another novelty at the Perugia Conference is the importance given to problems of the Mediterranean and the Middle East so far barely touched upon during previous meetings of the peace movement. For instance there was a roundtable of delegates from various countries of Southern Europe including an Israeli member of the "Committee Against War in Lebanon" and Illan Halevi, the representative of the PLO which for the first time ever had been invited to a conference of this kind. At first sight that organization, engaged in fighting for 40 years, does not seem to have much in common with the peace movement. But Mr Halevi stressed the way in which Israel uses the tension between blocs to secure almost unconditional support from the United States. The Palestinians, therefore, are directly interested in detente.

8796

CSO: 3519/429

POLITICAL AUSTRIA

CONTROVERSY IN SOCIALIST PARTY OVER ANDROSCH

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 12 Jul 84 p 3

[Report by "R. St.": "Political Summer Theater in Austria--Government Coalition Flagellates Itself"]

[Text] Vienna, 9 July--Austrian politics at present are proceeding at a level of demands for party disciplinary tribunals, of ministers suggesting to their colleagues who disagree with them on a particular issue that they resign, of other ministers accusing top officials in public of self-glorification, and of distinguished personages (acting as appeasers who, for the sake of containing the damage, would like to induce alleged insulters to apologize to those who feel insulted. Though as yet the internal constitution of the SPOe [Austrian Socialist Party] and the conflicts within the coalition are suitable for reproaches in sarcastic cartoons, serious commentators of the domestic political scene, even if they are highly critical of the Red-Blue [Socialist-Liberal] coalition, are shuddering more and more as they watch the politicians flagellating themselves.

One recalls the big crisis of the SPOe 20 years ago which finally ended in the condemnation of former Minister of the Interior Franz Olah and temporarily weakened the party considerably. At that time the Socialists were coalition partners in a government headed by a federal chancellor belonging to the OeVP [Austrian People's Party], and the activity of the government was not paralyzed by the split of the party. Today one gets the impression that decisions on issues are being inordinately delayed as a result of the confrontation within the party and the differences of opinion in the coalition.

Concrete Backgrounds and Their Ramifications

The personal quarrels have their specific backgrounds. One of these is the tax-audit proceedings against former Finance Minister Androsch—an affair which is dividing the Socialists. The other results from the fact that the small partner in the coalition, the FPOe [Austrian Liberal Party], from the very beginning opposed the inauguration of the Zwentendorf nuclear power plant and cannot drop this attitude, while the

SPOe wants to bring up the question again. The Socialists believe that the greatest political obstacle in the way of operations being started at Zwentendorf would be removed if a possibility was found for the final storing of the nuclear waste. Such a possibility was mooted by the head of the power system when he visited China--apparently successfully. Minister and FPOe Chairman Steger, feeling bypassed, gave vent to his displeasure. The day after, Construction Minister Sekanina made the logical remark that if Steger did not agree with the inauguration of Zwentendorf he could always resign. The former president of the soccer league had apparently overlooked the fact that coalition partners whom one depends on must be treated with greater care than coaches of the league. Steger himself, responsible for the power industry, cut a strange figure when under the pressure of a small protest movement and to the horror of his staff he suddenly declared a hydropower station in Reichraming, Upper Austria, to be redundant and charged the power industry with self-glorification.

Irate Former Federal Chancellor

In the Androsch affair the renewed audit of the financing of his villa was taking such a long time as to create the impression that political opponents of the general manager of the Creditanstalt Bank were waiting for the most propitious moment to destroy him once for all. Rightly or wrongly, wide sections of the population have come to believe that the affair will have the result which is to the liking of the trend in the SPOe which has the upper hand at the particular moment. The remark made by former Federal Chancellor Kreisky at one time that Androsch lacked integrity has doubtless made it more difficult to assess the affair objectively. The displeasure caused by this development was expressed by Styrian SPOe Deputy Offenbeck when she stated that Kreisky had a hand in the case of Androsch. Taking this charge amiss, the honorary party chairman, following this not particularly courteous remark, called for the convening of a party arbitration commission. On both sides SPOe officials of the highest rank made efforts ot appeasement, with Mrs Offenbeck being asked twice via television to offer an apology. In contrast with many men in a similar situation, she stuck to her guns and did not retract her statement. In light of Kreisky's apparent oversensitivity, many loyal followers of his are finding it hard to support him. The Androsch affair has long since ceased to be limited to the question as to how the onetime heir apparent got the funds for his villa. Rather, the dispute is revealing personal support and enmity as well as political positions.

Weaknesses of Government and Opposition

Federal Chancellor Sinowatz can take credit for the fact that he tried to stay out of the personal controversy, but he did not manage to contain the crises. Various utterances in the Androsch affair created the fatal impression that while it was important to have justice prevail, it was even more important for the Socialist Party not to suffer any damage as

a result of the affair. In the dispute surrounding Zwentendorf, Sinowatz dissociated himself from Sekanina's attacks on Steger. What hurts the government in the matter is the lack of an energy plan and of precisely set priorities for the production of power.

The opposition OeVP, particularly party head Mock and Secretary General Graff, have also had to put up with a lot of criticism by middle-class newspapers for their so far unproved accusations against Androsch. Since Sinowatz took office, the People's Party has been on a constant slight upswing, not least because it presented itself to the Austrians as a party of cooperation. Among Androsch's political friends and promoters continues to be Trade Union Federation President Benya, without whose cooperation a later cooperation between the major parties is hardly possible. Middle-class circles and many of those who long for a change in administration by 1987 at the latest would prefer the OeVP to demonstrate its leadership qualities not by exploiting scandals but with new programs. OeVP economic spokesman Graff advised his party to keep silent about the Androsch affair and to concentrate more on issues. Particularly the latter part of the appeal looks worthwhile, and this is something which should guide the government as well.

8790

CSO: 3620/378

VAN MIERT ON SOCIALIST SUCCESS IN EUROELECTIONS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 7-8 Jul 84 p 2

[Article by Catherine Ferrant and Jacques van Horebeeke]

[Text] "Flanders is moving forward! Our success in the recent European elections proves that it is breaking loose from its yoke, and that today it tends to prefer a clear, new message to the contradictions of the CVP. But the success of socialism in Flanders is not enough to make a happy man of me. I regret our current problems with the PS, which was wrong to put community affairs before socio-economic matters. On this point we cannot go alone with Spitaels. However, whatever happens, we must form a coalition with the French-speaking socialists to compete with the other parties...."

This was "Mr Flanders" speaking at the latest European elections. With his 500,000 votes, Karel Van Miert, president of the SP, does not seem content with this election victory. We decided to look him up the day after the meeting of European socialists in Florence, to hear what he had to say about the election, of course, but also to find out what the standing of his relationship was with the PS. He had warned us: "I will not talk about Happart!" However, as we spoke with him, he gradually lost his reserve and in the end did not avoid any controversial subjects....

"For the past 30 years, we have been slowly but surely moving backwards. In 1979, the trend reversed itself. And today, we have made spectacular gains!" Obviously content, and even surprised, over the progress of the SP, Karel Van Miert analyzes it in detail.

"We thought for a long time," he explained, "that the Flemish electorate was fixed, immovable. But today it is waking up! The 'Green' phemonenon, which we thought was confined to Wallonia, has spread to Flanders. We are progressing. The PVV and the CVP now comprise only 46 percent of the votes. This is more than just a temporary change.

Towards the Christians

Of course, Karel Van Miert logically begins explaining his party's success by pointing to all the improvements that have been made in the past few years. "Our parliamentary group is the most dynamic one. Our members of

parliament are young and dynamic. Willy Claes and then myself have appealed to the young people to assume their responsibilities and get rid of the rigid, anticlerical, close-minded image our party has been suffering from. And then," he went on to say, "we made an effort to be more open to the Christians. The election of Father Ulburghs is a sign of this. Flanders today is ready to gradually open up to other philosophies. We already have Protestants and Jews among us. Today Christians feel at home with the Socialist Party."

Has this been done without any gnashing of teeth within the Party? According to Van Miert, "there have been ups and downs. In the traditional socialist bastions—Gand, Antwerp, Malines—the idea of a coalition with the Christians is not very well received. But everything is becoming possible. In the rightist ranks, this alliance with the Christians goes further back: the PVV has been "swiping" Catholic votes from the CVP for a long time...."

The CVP.... In a sense, it also contributed to the Socialist victory in Flanders. "We speak out clearly, unlike our adversaries. The CVP has been able to maintain its strength for a long time because it was able to hide its contradictions. We have put the finger on these ambiguities and this fuzziness. This explains our victory—and their defeat...."

CVP, PVV? Nothing Ruled Out....

And then there was the impact of a (too?) efficiently run, personal campaign. Van Miert is proud of it: "We began before the others and chose simple, obvious subjects and well-known men and women. Of course, it was very expensive: a little less than 20 million. In the beginning, we estimated 14...."

The progress of the SP, related to the setbacks of the PVV, has singularly changed the political map in Flanders. Who will Van Miert play with when he returns to power? "I would not rule out anything!" the SP President says. "What is important, is to have a true majority. With the CVP? It has a democratic wing, which increases the common ground. But historically we have always been antagonists.... The PVV? It is difficult to find common ground with them at the present time. But, I would not close the door..."

In any case, this question is not as timely as the question of relations with other Socialist Parties. European and Belgian.

"It is said that we are peace-loving. This is not really the proper term. In fact, our position is close to that of the Dutch, Germans, and Norwegians—yes to NATO, no to escalation and the infernal arguments of the arms race. This separates us from the Latin Socialist Parties. But, at least things are clear. We do not try to hide our contradictions. Moreover, you will notice that what is called "pacifism" is a widespread sentiment in Flanders: The Volksunie, which is not leftist, is relatively "peace-loving". The PVV is much less "pro-missile" than the PRL. It is a question of people and civiliation....

No Agreement on Brussels.

And now we come to the community question. Karel Van Miert ventures forth, cautiously, but directly. "Yes, we have a problem, a major problem with the PS. I am sorry that Spitaels backed the community—during the election campaign, but also earlier—while we have been putting all the emphasis on socio—economic issues, peace, the environment....

But are not Tobback, Galle, signatories of incendiary community proposals, also Flemish socialists? "I am not saying that we are not interested in the community issue. But, we do not give it top priority! And, it is obvious, that for the time being, no agreement is possible between the SP and the PS on the Fourons or Brussels.... It was futile, in these circumstances, to raise the stakes, the Happart candidacy for instance.

Will these community differences among the Socialists be decisive when it comes time to overcome national opposition? "We are forced to reach an understanding, even on this point!" Van Miert exclaims. "It is inconceivable that we will not find ourselves together in a national government. So we must discuss things point by point. We have agreed to talk about expanding the powers of the regions and their resources in the field of education, for example... And gradually, we will be able to reach an understanding on thornier issues... An overall community agreement is not a prerequisite for me. Things must settle down. The French-speaking Belgians will not find any Flemish partners to change the status of Brussels and the Fourons!"

The message is clear. And, translated into current, every-day political terms, it very clearly says that Karel Van Miert still takes an "anti-Happart" position. "This choice was a mistaken," he says. "We cannot accept it. We have always said, it is the PS which is on the wrong track...at the Walloon and European level!"

One more point. In reference to the future of Karel Van Miert. "I have 7 years as president behind me. And yet, I will run for this position in November at the next SP congress. For the last time? That is up to my Party...."

9805

cso: 3619/74

POLITICAL BELGIUM

CVP'S GIJS ON PARTY'S ROLE, INF, ENERGY, ECONOMY

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 4 Jul 84 pp 13-15

[Interview with Bob Gijs, leader of the CVP (Social Christian Party) senators, by Frank Verleyen: "The 'Voting Club' of Bob Gijs"; date and place not given]

[Text] The parliamentary year died out like a candle, without a great debate on the so-called recovery bill and in almost empty halls. Member of the Chamber Blanckaert, the CVP parliamentary group leader, is likely to transfer to the court of arbitration, and Luc Van den Brande will probably be his successor. Bob Gijs remains in the senate, however.

A few months ago the leader of the CVP senators caused some consternation as the initiator of an accord with his opposition colleagues, in which support was emphatically promised to the Martens V Cabinet. A hurried press conference was needed—and on a Sunday at that—to explain that this was /not/ a matter of an unusual practice or a voluntary submission by the legislative power to the executive power. It did not go over too well, however, and Gijs felt he had been treated discourteously by the media. This psychologist from Antwerp, a market—researcher by profession, nevertheless is very well—spoken and plays the role of advisor to the publishers of the TOPICS weekly. Since 17 June and the election defeat of the CVP, he has been thinking in depth about various matters.

[Question] Has the CVP arrived at its natural sociological minimum-following of about 30 percent?

Senator Bob Gijs: You could say that. It is a base percentage which will not be gone below in the short term. However, political parties ought to compete precisely for the favor of people who do not belong to their sociological base. They fight for the adherence of their determined non-voters, the so-called floating mass, whose number is increasing in my opinion.

[Question] The usual criticism of the CVP concerns what is called its lack of clarity—not knowing the direction it is taking—as well as the greatly diverging personalities and types of policies in the same party. Just imagine Luc Dhoore as minister of Environmental Planning; that would yield an entirely different policy from that of a Paul Akkermans. Both are CVP people, however.

Gijs: I think that the CVP has a communication problem. It is not a disciplinary party with a strict line. There is room for many internal differences. For that matter, that is part of our policy. Another handicap for good intelligibility is our almost self-evident participation in governments. That requires the CVP to find not the clearest standpoint, but the best one. The demand for strict clarity basically is a demand for a two-party system with clear profiles. But that is almost counter to our philosophy. Socialism and liberalism came into being on the basis of just feelings and insights. But we don't believe in the permanent value of those ways of thinking. The world and its problems change. Pressed by realities, the left and the right in Europe are now pursuing more or less the same policy.

Anything that is extreme is clear, of course. The CVP, however, acts leftist in an environment of rightist alienation and rightist in the opposite case. It accepts that human reality is too complex for one permanent scheme. Intellectuals and political scientists naturally find that difficult to deal with. They like to look at the histories of political parties and at their originating in the last century on the basis of clear needs. However, the CVP was not a real party until the last world war; rather, we were a type of voting club of people who made up "the majority of the population," who composed voting lists and who agreed on fundamental matters without deep philosophies or discussions. Therefore a real CVP state, with a real party paper, etc., is impossible or at least undesirable.

Jewish-Christian

[Question] Still, isn't it worthwhile to look back at themes and standpoints of this past year and to find out what you, as parliamentary group leader, think about that exactly? Let's start with the Galle decree, called "useless and dangerous for Flanders" by the CVP.

Gijs: That decree poses the question: is mastery of the language of the region in which one is elected a condition for eligibility? In my view that is indeed a condition, and I hope that the Council of State will also see it that way. If that is the case, then its decisions must be binding and carried out by everyone. If that is not done, then the fall of the government is inevitable, even though another communal crisis would not benefit the regime.

[Question] How would your parliamentary group vote right now on the placing of American nuclear missiles on Belgian territory?

Gijs: I myself believe that that placing lessens the threat of war in Europe, but I cannot prove that to the people. If I could, no one would mind having a missile in his backyard. The people don't want that now; as a matter of fact, the problem requires considerable knowledge and information.

Secondly, I think that the NATO dual decision is in line with the Harmel Doctrine: be determined, but don't neglect any opportunity for /contact/with the Soviet bloc. Don't cultivate an enemy image; accept that the Soviet Union is a functioning society and cooperate with it as much as possible

in areas of culture, the economy, sports . . . In the senate we ourselves have multiplied the number of contacts with people from Eastern Europe by a factor of 10 in the last 10 years. We have not done what President Reagan has done, emphasize the differences, but the other way around; we have worked behind the scenes according to a non-conflict model. On principle the CVP always does that and in all areas. However, if Belgium were to decide on a unilateral, basically symbolic, gesture not to place, then one first ought to be sure that such a symbol is understood and explained in the same manner on both sides.

[Question] Another type of lack of clarity was observed in the CVP during the abortion discussion. Your party wants to keep abortion in the penal code but prevent it in practice by means of "positive measures." Right after taking that position, the CVP canceled contraceptives in the list of reimbursements by health insurance funds. You'll probably have to pay a price for something like that.

Gijs: A large majority of the senate group would vote against abortion even now. The CVP is, after all, partly religiously inspired. Our civilization is based not only on the Roman-Grecian ideal of, let's say, the humanistic person, but also the Jewish-Christian ideal. The Romans and Greeks admired the human being for what he /is/; Judaic Christianity grants him worthiness for what he must /become/, for what he is called to do by something outside of himself. Voting in favor of abortion goes directly against that christian conviction.

Limburg

[Question] Another dominant theme in the recent parliamentary season was the reorganization of the Walloon steel company Cockerill-Sambre. The CVP and its ministers said that that question now has been regionalized. The Walloon ministers of the same cabinet actually claimed the opposite, and parliament meekly acquiesced in the situation.

Gijs: In the parliamentary group we think that regionalization of the economy is inevitable because sentiment has developed in that direction. But simultaneously we find it is a little absurd; in a Europe which is striving for less clearly defined economic borders, we are going to add one at the southern border of Flanders. You don't find that in any federal state. What's worse; education, an area eminently suitable for federalization, also has remained national in our country for the sake of the school pact.

As to the financing of the four remaining national branches of industry, I do indeed think that it will hamper future budgetary opportunities for the regions. The regions can no more decide now on the same manner to spend their endowments than before the Cockerill accord. In a year's time, when the Limburg coal problem surfaces, we will certainly realize that ourselves.

[Question] Indeed! The CVP launched an emergency plan for Limburg and pleaded for a coal plant, but subsequently supported the nuclear park of Chooz and Doel V, which threatens to make that plant superfluous.

Gijs: I think that diversification of our energy supply is strategically the best and safest solution. I like to compare that to the European agricultural policy; it is expensive for us, but it guarantees us a food supply which is not only very varied for the consumer but is also self-supporting. Europe is not dependent on others for its agricultural raw materials. You must do the same with energy, I think, even if you have to pay an insurance premium for it. The Limburg mining industry thus must remain operational, partly at the expense of the other Flemish provinces. That does not mean, however, that one should hold onto those mines as the heart or backbone and as the only expansion factor of the Limburg economy. A comprehensive reconversion plan must also be carried out.

[Question] It is possible that the population received an impression of unreliability when, after the installation of the Martens V Cabinet, the CVP suddenly sang in various keys: "the socialists are to blame for the crisis." After all those years as political bedfellows that did not seem such a nice exchange of partners.

Gijs: All over the world, christian democracy takes the position opposite of exaggeration—of an exceedingly leftist or liberal alienation. In Belgium also, it has a correctional function which can be proven historically.

Who is responsible for the Belgian crisis? All parties, the entire society, mistakenly believed that the economy would continue to grow naturally as a matter of course. According to the Club of Rome we even ought to take steps to halt that growth, remember? The belief in growth has taught us to live off the future: families, industries and governments, everyone started working with "outside capital." In times of growth the socialists are the best partners for us. They know about fair division. Now that it is a matter of protecting economic principles, so that in a few years' time there is something left to be divided, the socialists have declared themselves unable or unwilling to participate.

[Question] What is also strange is the "silence of the CVP." Chairman Swaelen openly subordinated the party to the government; her project coincides with that of Martens V. But how can it still be a "movement" then; isn't that what she wants?

Gijs: The CVP is not the servant but the driving force of this cabinet. Its (electorally unappreciated) JET plan of 1981 is being carried out fully, whatever the liberal partner may want or may assert.

Work and Live

[Question] Unemployment remains very high, however. Tax burdens have increased by 10 percent and the budget deficit has assumed disastrous proportions.

Gijs: First about that unemployment. Perhaps we are holding on to the old scale of values too much, which says that a person must live to work and not work to live., I often think that technological development will

reverse that value; it will yield more financial profit than is necessary for an economic production process with full employment. Shouldn't we start adapting the systems to the image of a number of citizens who, content and worthy, receive a good income without having to act as agent of the production process? We must dare ask that question. In the meantime I have determined that the Belgian unemployment figures are no longer the highest in Europe.

As to the budget, it forms the calculated whole of solidarity, of redistribution. 90 Percent of the state expenditures go to ordinary citizens, don't forget that. But solidarity is less an economic than an ethical concept. And that must be remembered, for I have read that in Belgium there are 800,000 handicapped who are entitled to benefits. Well, that is impossible. Thus the politicians must explain that among them there are those who abuse the system and are getting something they are not entitled to and, what's worse, they are using up financial means needed by the really needy.

[Question] In your view, how high may the coming budget deficit of Martens V go?

Gijs: I don't want to put a figure on that. The limit of 7.5 percent of the GNP sought by the government was an altogether unrealistic plan. The accumulated burden of debt has started to lead its own life. It started when we went over 2,000 billion and now it has become practically uncontrollable.

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POIL: SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY INCREASES MOST IN SUPPORT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 July 84 p 3

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[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen: "Gallup: SF Repeats EC Election Success"]

[Text] Poll shows a marked change in voter support away from the government parties, CD and V, as well as the Radical Liberal Party to SF.

The marked success of the Socialist People's Party (SF) in the EC election 14 June would clearly manifest itself in terms of greater representation in Parliament as well if a parliamentary election were held now, according to the latest Gallup poll.

SF would be the only winner if an election were held now and gain four parliamentary seats. The Conservative Party, the largest Danish party in the EC election, would have to be content with its present representation in Parliament if an election were held now, compared to the clear gains made by the party since the January election.

According to Gallup, SF would become the third largest party in Denmark, and its advance would be due to the loss of one seat each by the Radical Liberal Party (RV), the Center-Democratic Party (CD) and the Liberal Party (V), and finally because the former Progressive Party, now the Free Democrats' representative Ole Maisted is leaving Parliament.

It is remarkable that, according to the opinion poll, SF would not only gain votes from within the socialist block or the block of government parties; voter sentiment now means that the Progressive Party would resume its old power position relative to the government and be crucial as far as majority is concerned.

The distribution of seats would look like this based on the Gallup poll, except for the two seats elected on The Faroe Islands and the two on Greenland:

	Now	Gallup
Social Democratic Party (S)	56	56
Radical Liberal Party (R)	10	9
Conservative Party (K)	42	42
Socialist People's Party (SF)	21	25
Center-Democratic Party (CD)	8	7
Christian People's Party (KRF)	- 5	5
Liberal Party (V)	22	21
Socialist Left Party (VS)	5	5
Progressive Party (FRP)	5	5
Free Democrats	1	0

Political Poll

Question: "Which party would you vote for if a parliamentary election were held tomorrow?"

Data collected: 2 to 16 June 1984

•	10 Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June
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e di silan da esp.	%	%	%	%	%	%
Social Democratic Party	31.6	31.0	31.1	32.2	32.2	32.1
Radical Liberal Party	5.5	5.5	5.5	· 5.8	5.8	5.3
Conservative Party	23.4	24.7	25.6	25.2	24.5	23.5
Single-Tax Party	1.5	. · -			=.	
Socialist People's Party	11.5	11.2	12.5	12.1	12.1	13.9
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Communist Party	0.7					
Marxist-Leninist Party	0.0	_	– 15		_	104-0
Center-Democratic Party	4.6	5.0	4.5	3.8	4.2	4.2
Christian People's Party	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.2	2.3	2.7
Liberal Party	12.1	12.1	11.7	11.2	12.2	11.7
Socialist Left Party	2.7	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.5	2.6
Progressive Party	3.6	3.5	2.4	2.6	2.2	2.6
Other parties *	_	2.2	2.0	2.9	2.0	2.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

^{*} Parties with less than 2 percent of the votes

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POLITICAL DENMARK

POLL EXAMINES ATTITUDES OF YOUTH TOWARD PARTIES, SOCIETY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 July 84 p 5

[Article by Dan Axel and Michael Ehrenreich: "Self-Portrait of Youth: Rather Satisfied With Life"]

[Text] Danish youth prefers the Socialist People's Party, the Conservative Party and the Social Democratic Party. Two thirds of the youth believe we will never return to full employment.

Young people in Denmark are quite well satisfied with life and do not want any revolutionary social changes. Young people prefer to be regarded as individuals and not categorized as punks, flips or rockers, not to speak of identification with certain grassroots movements. The concept of freedom is highly valued among Danish youth as well.

This is according to a self-portrait drawn by 900 young persons between the ages of 15 and 29 in a Gallup poll financed by Conservative Youth with money from surplus receipts from the state-run betting pool. The poll will be published tomorrow in DANISH YOUTH.

Some 47 percent of the youth polled said they were very satisfied with life and 44 percent were satisfied, while only six percent indicated dissatisfaction is greatest in Copenhagen and the northern suburbs, on Lolland-Falster, Bornholm and in Western Jutland.

It will hardly surprise anyone that youth agrees mostly with the opinions of its friends rather than those of its parents and school teachers, but it is remarkable that today's youth does not want to be identified with any of the youth groups into which many, for lack of something better, like to divide them. Danish youth prefers to be independent.

"The disks," comprising about 18 percent of the youth generally, but with whom about one third of the very young between 15 and 19 years of age identifies, are the exception. However, "the flips," a concept of the sixties, are meeting with hard times if we can believe the poll.

Very few youths are active in grassroots or protest movements. Five percent answered "yes" to the question about whether they are active in these movements, while 14 percent said they had thought about joining such movements at one time. The number of youths who had contemplated joining grew with age, but only a few actually went through with it, according to the poll. Moreover, in the opinion of youth, grassroots movements are largely influenced by socialist ideas.

Half of the youth in Denmark values the concept of freedom more than the concept of equality, which is valued the most by some 17 percent. Some 26 percent value both concepts equally.

Politics

The government's role in society is a much debated topic and most young people have a clear position on this issue. Some 31 percent said the government has too much influence, while only six percent said too little, and 45 percent were well satisfied with the government's role as it is now. Furthermore, opposition to government influence grew with age.

According to youth, one of the government's big responsibilities is to provide leisure activities for youth, and this the government is doing quite well. Some 59 percent said there are sufficient leisure activities for youth, while 29 percent said the opposite.

Two thirds of those polled believe we will never return to full employment, while 43 percent felt that shorter working hours would be the best solution among a number of chosen possibilities to provide work for more people. Some 31 percent felt that improving conditions for private industry would be the road to pursue, while only eight percent believed that employment measures would be a good way to fight unemployment.

Almost 200 of those polled had never voted when the poll was taken but, among the rest, the Socialist People's Party was the preferred party, followed closely by the Conservative and the Social Democratic parties. These three parties received 147, 131 and 129 votes respectively, while the Liberal Party only got 46 votes and the Socialist Left Party (VS) and the Radical Liberal Party each got 27 votes. Some 73 youths did not vote.

About 50 percent of those polled felt that demonstrations are suitable means to obtain political results, and young people (40 percent) are sympathetic to actions employed by the BZ's, for example. On the other hand, there is no sympathy with "Help-yourself" actions, where young people help themselves to merchandise in stores without paying for it.

About 50 percent of those polled supported limiting admission to institutions of higher learning, while 25 percent felt that such limits should be removed. Student remuneration is reasonable and right, according to 69 percent of the youth polled, and present student aid should not be dependent upon parents' income, according to the majority of those polled.

"Are you generally very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with life?"

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Copyright Gallup Market Analysis Inc.	Percent total	Sex: Men Women	Age: 15-17 18-19 20-24 25-29

"Are you generally very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with Life?" Copyright Gallup Market Analysis Inc.

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Conservative Party (C)	61	29	·Ω	, 1	5	100	135
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"Which of these groups do you identify with the most?" (Show card)

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"To what degree do you sympathize with actions employed by the BZ's? Do you have much sympathy, some sympathy or no sympathy?" $\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} \right)^{2} \left$

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MODERATION AMONG YOUTH THREAT TO LEFT SOCIALISTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 3 July 84 p 2

[Article by Steffen Jensen: "Youth Is Satisfied--But Not Uncritical"]

[Text] "Youth is democratic, tolerant and positive--neither revolutionary nor desirous of social reform. If this continues, the Socialist Left Party (VS) will be out of Danish politics in 5 years," said the chairman of the Government Youth Committee.

"Youth is generally satisfied with life and is extremely democratic, tolerant and positive."

This testimonial was given Danish youth by Lars Lundgaard, chairman of the Government Youth Committee and social director of Ribe county.

Yesterday BERLINGSKE publicized a Gallup poll which showed that youth generally is satisfied with life. Some 91 percent of the youth are satisfied, compared to a dissatisfied minority of six percent.

"Actually, these figures do not surprise me. A comprehensive EC youth poll taken in the fall of 1983 showed the same, namely that youth generally is satisfied with life.

"But we probably need to differentiate between satisfaction with life generally and being satisfied with more specific things in everyday life," said Lundgaard.

His view is supported by Assistant Professor Benedicte Madsen with Arhus University Psychological Institute:

"The answers would no doubt be different if youth were asked about living conditions, the economy, employment and housing," she said.

"Though you may be very dissatisfied with two or three specific things, it would take quite a bit more before you could say you were dissatisfied with life as a whole. For many youths, this question would be interpreted as an inquiry about how they themselves manage their lives rather than what opportunities society offers them."

With respect to youth's political preference, the Gallup poll showed much support for the Socialist People's Party (SF), the Social Democratic and the Conservative parties. Some 17 percent supported SF, 15 percent would vote for the Conservative Party and 14 percent for the Social Democratic Party. According to Gallup, fringe parties do not have much support among youth.

"If possible, Danish youth is more democratic now than ever," said social director Lundgaard. "Only a very few percent of the young people may be referred to as revolutionary or socially reformist. The EC poll also showed this. But the fact that youth is satisfied with life does not mean it is uncritical because it is. However, it is constructively critical and this is important.

"Normally, youth has most often identified with political fringe parties.

"But, surprisingly enough, this is changing," Lundgaard continued. "The last 2 to 3 years, the Conservative Party has been the big and trustworthy drawing point to the right. Glistrup, who used to stand there with clear and new ideas, is of course on his way out.

"However, it is interesting to note that the Socialist Left Party is also on its way out. Rather quietly, youth has gravitated to the Socialist People's Party. Indications are that if this continues, VS will be out of Danish politics in 5 years.

"On the other hand, we must not overlook the fact that political personalities like Gert Pedersen and Poul Schluter can attract youth," said Lundgaard.

Among almost 900 youths between the ages of 15 and 29 who took part in the Gallup poll, only five percent were active in any of the so-called "grassroots movements."

"The myth about youth's enormous involvement in grassroots activities only thrives in special Copenhagen intellectual circles. Hence, the polling result is not surprising.

"Our Government Youth-Committee poll clearly showed that most of those who are active in grassroots movements are 30 to 40 years of age and come from rather well-educated circles. Most young people are not active in grassroots movements nor in political party work."

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CSO: 3613/191

POLITICAL FINLAND

MODERATES SOLIDIFY GAINS FOLLOWING CP CONGRESS

Majority Bypasses District Organizations

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Jun 84 p 11

[Article: "SKP Leaders to Split Stalinist Front"]

[Text] In the hands of completely traditional moderates, the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) leadership has set out to split the Stalinist district front. The first decisions will be made at a Central Committee session to be held today, Friday.

The moderate leadership is directing its opening volley at the hardest heads of the eight Stalinist districts. the Uusimaa and Turku district organizations.

According to Communist sources, the SKP Politburo is proposing to the Central Committee that they begin to channel the party work of the Uusimaa and Turku districts from the party leaders directly past the district organizations. At this point, however, the plan is to stop the establishment of parallel organizations. In the opinion of the moderates, Uusimaa and Turku were the shrillest in dissociating themselves from the party congress resolutions.

At the 20th party congress held at the end of May the moderates occupied the Central Committee and the Politburo when the Stalinists rejected the seats offered by the moderates — however, the Stalinists did not march out. Furthermore, former chairman Jouko Kajanoja, who was elected to the Central Committee, has abstained from performing his functions.

The Stalinists have demanded a special congress within 6 months with new congress delegates to rectify the resolutions of the "unsuccessful" 20th party congress. Under fire by the Stalinists are especially SKP chairman Arvo Aalto and first secretary Aarno Aitamurto.

Controlled by Markus Kainulainen, the Uusimaa district, which at its special district meeting demanded that a nationwide parallel organization, a Communist committee, be formed right at the outset and that a special congress be held only after that.

Uusimaa's demand has not more widely taken hold in the other Stalinist districts, which have merely concentrated on demanding a special congress and a change of party leadership, which the moderates have rejected.

The same feeling prevailed in the Turku district as in Uusimaa, however, not as sharply worded.

According to Communist sources, the status of Kainulainen and Turku district secretary Toive Forssi will be discussed by the Central Committee, but at least no motion to have them resign has been made. The Central Committee has the right to force a district secretary to resign, whereas a party congress decision is needed to oust a district.

The Central Committee plans to appoint someone to conduct the party's central leadership duties in Uusimaa and it intends to financially beef up Turku district moderate activities.

Personnel Arrangements

The Central Committee will also discuss personnel arrangements, which will at first affect five or six individuals. Some of those who are leaving will be transferred to other duties, voluntarily resign or go into retirement and some will be dismissed. Culture secretary Erkki Rautee is going into retirement. Petteri Baeri and Reijo Kalmakurki are threatened with departure from the Stelinists.

According to reports, moderate leaders have different views on how tightly they ought to hang onto their Stalinist officials. They plan to make new personnel arrangements in August.

Stalinist district representatives will meet first thing Saturday to evaluate the Central Committee decisions. According to reports, the Stalinists intend to stand firm on their demand for a new party congress, but a decision on presenting the demand to the Central Committee will probably not yet be made.

Aitamurto's Strategy Examined

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Jun 84 p 7

[Article: "SKP Turmover Set Cautiously in Motion; Moderate Leaders Invade Two Stalinist District Areas"]

[Text] On Friday SKP moderate leaders cautiously began the turnover of Stalinist-held posts by deciding to start handling party business under moderate leadership in the Stalinist districts of Uusimaa and Turku.

Meeting in Relsinki, the SKP Central Committee gave its blessing to the decision made by the party Politburo, according to which funds would be granted for the work that has been set in motion in the Uusimaa and Turku district areas.

The party leadership defended its decision on the basis of the fact that Uusimaa and Turku, which pursue a Stalinist hard line, have neither agreed to carry out the 20th party congress resolutions nor to conduct party business in accordance with Central Committee decisions and directives.

Meeting for the first time since the party congress, the Central Committee also decided to purge the SKP's Culture Department. All told, the Central Committee decided to dismiss five officials.

Culture Department chief Erkki Rautee, who supervises the party's cultural effort and ideological training, will go into retirement. Rautee has recently expressed third-line views.

The Central Committee fired Pekka Aalto and former department employee Risto-Juhani Suokas, who has served as the Politburo secretary for the past couple of years, from the Culture Department. Stalinist Reijo Kalmakurki, who has served in the Culture Department and was a member of the SKP Secretariat before the party congress, was also kicked out.

The Central Committee fired Petteri Baeri, who has a Stalinist background, and Seppo Timonen, considered to be a third-liner, from the SKP Economic Department. Aalto, Suokas and Timonen are former moderates.

The Central Committee defended its dismissal decisions on the basis of the SKP's economic situation, because of which employees will have to be cut back as part of the economy measures. In accordance with the Central Committee decision, they discussed arranging for jobs or student positions with those who were dismissed. This is, however, on the condition that "it will end in harmonious working relations."

New arrangements for personnel are to be expected in August when the Central Committee meets next.

"Not a Bridgehead Position"

The Central Committee decision on party work to be arranged for in the Uusimaa and Turku district areas means that the Central Committee is setting out to bypass the Stalinist district leadership in controlling activities. Now they have assigned funds to subsidize implementation of this action and later they plan to choose people to organize it.

In first secretary Aarno Aitamurto's opinion, the action cannot be called the opening of a moderate bridgehead position in the eight Stalinist district areas. In both the moderate and Stalinist districts there are opposition organizations that have, however, not become visible at party congresses, for example, because of tight organizing.

According to Aitamurto, the pressure to strengthen their own actions has been strongest in precisely the Uusimaa and Turku areas. He described the process as a cautious initial phase and hoped that reason would win out. He stressed

the fact that, being in this new situation, the party has no reason for pushing things to the brink of a split with tough organization actions.

Aitamurto also drew attention to the fact that there are different attitudes in the different Stalinist districts. Since the party congress, the most sharply worded comments have been heard in precisely the Uusimaa and Turku districts.

At Culture House attention was drawn to the fact that not all of the Central Committee's Stalinist employees were dismissed. For example, Eero Tuominen, who comes from the Kymenlaakso district, was allowed to keep his job. Kymenlaakso is Stalinist leader Taisto Sinisalo's strongest support district.

The Central Committee decided to found a new theoretical political review, which will be called KOMMUNISTI, for the SKP. The review's opening issue will appear in August and to start with it will appear at least once a month.

SKP information secretary Oiva Bjorkbacka was appointed chief editor of KOMMUNISTI and Ritva Cortes. Timo Ravela and Pentti Sare editors.

In his review of the situation SKP chairman Arvo Aalto wondered why they wanted to set the SKP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union against one another, "since the party leadership elected at the 20th congress is not doing that nor will it do so." Aalto did not go into the SKP internal situation much either.

In his speech first secretary Aitamurto took up the fear that has arisen among members that narrowmindedness would take over in the SKP. "There is no room for that here, nor would there be any sense in it. We have, after all, in particular defended freedom of discussion. There is room in our party for different ways of thinking." Aitamurto said.

In his speech SKP information secretary Bjorkbacka tackled the press debate, which has given rise to high feelings. In his opinion, the publicity the SKP has received has not been only favorable. However, according to Bjorkbacka, "as a rule our affairs have been chiefly objectively reported in the news media."

The Central Committee has endorsed positions in which they demand the evening out of reginnal differences with regard to development and reject proposals for the merger of the Kemi Company into a concern headed by the KOP [National Joint-Stock Bank] and composed of the Oulu Company and the Kajaani Company.

Stalinist Paper on Changes

Helsinki TTEDCNANTAJA in Finnish 19 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial: "The Discord Sowers Must Be Stopped"]

[Text] Reporting on the first meeting of the SKP's new rump Central Committee, KANSAN UUTISHT said that they were moving into a "period of action" in the party. This "action" does not mean focusing on fighting missions of current interest, but concentrating on the dissipation of the party and the workers' fighting

strength. The rump Central Committee has decided to make parallel activities more effective in the SKP's Turku and Uusimaa district organization areas and discharge a number of main office employees.

The actions against the district organizations, which in keeping with the conservative faction's divisive tactics are at first being directed against the Turku and Uusimaa districts, are paving the way for the establishment of parallel district organizations and in the end the expulsion of the existing district organizations on the basis of Marxist-Leninism and the main party line. The attack is aimed at all of the eight district organizations that defend the party line, the great majority of the party members and the entire party.

These dismissals of officials represent persecution because of one's opinions, which is typical of the conservative faction led by Arvo Aalto and Aarmo Aitamurto. The election of leaders conducted at the 20th party congress and also the dismissals were in keeping with this kind of persecution. This is not a question of a so-called factional purge, but of driving out all those who defend the party line and party unity, whether they belong or do not belong to so-called factions, and who are therefore undesirable as far as the conservative faction is concerned. This persecution for one' opinions will continue to be engaged in as an accompaniment to speeches emphasizing "broadmindedness" and "tolerance." We cannot now maintain any false illusions that anything but this is involved.

The purpose of these forced decisions can be seen just as clearly. That purpose is to change the policy line and nature of the SKP and to split the party in two. Any other explanations are intended to delude people.

The SKP is not at the present time merely in some sort of long-lasting crisis phase. The SKP is on the verge of its final disintegration and destruction as a communist party. Only a special and unifying congress can save the party. A joint meeting of representatives of the eight SKP district organizations has recommended that each of the district organizations demand that such a congress be held.

The eight-district meeting in an open letter to all Communists also urged them to join in a common struggle to save the party. In the letter they express their full solidarity with the district organizations and comrades who have come under attack.

"If the forced decisions that have been made are not rescinded and the rump Central Committee continues to organize parallel activities in violation of the wishes and rights of party members, the district organizations will, in accordance with the SKP's main line and rules, be obliged and entitled to protect Communist activities and district organization rights with all necessary means."

Leading Paper Comments

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial: "They Do Not Want to Effect a Return to Discipline in the SKP"]

[Text] The new SKP leadership has let some fresh air into the party. It appears to have seriously assumed the mission of implementing a tougher policy. It no longer recognizes any split, as first secretary Aarno Aitamurto has just said. "The party has not other policy than the one the Central Committee and the party leadership pursue."

In the beginning the new command was concerned with purging certain individuals, which was publicly justified in terms of balancing the party's economy. At the same time the party leaders began to steer financial support to certain members in those districts controlled by the Stalinists who observe the party line and party directives.

According to the first secretary, the party is also forced to interfere with those parallel activities the Stalinists have developed in the areas of the moderate-controlled districts. Approved by the party congress, "the organizational policy position paper obliges the party leadership to take care of the guidance of party operations in all the district organizations."

Party regulations serve to support the actions of the party leaders. As is usual in communist parties, they are based on the so-called principle of democratic centralism, the concentration of power: The power is at the top. The decisions of the governing bodies, even those made by the moderates, must be observed by all organization members. The rules say that factions opposed to the party are not allowed in the party. To maintain party discipline, the harshest penalty is expulsion from the party.

While the rules have been interpreted loosely during the 18-year SKP dispute, the new party leadership is now viewing them more exactly than before. With their aid it has set about steamrollering party unity without, however, wishing to "suppress dissidents," as Aitamurto puts it.

The dissident Stalinists, on the other hand, are infuriated over the defeat they suffered at the recent party congress, a defeat they have not swallowed. Quite the contrary, they have shown themselves to be poor losers. Immediately after the decisions were made, the are demanding a new special congress, still beating the war drum and striving to revive the will to fight among their ranks to achieve their objective.

The ultimate Stalinist goal within the SKP is, of course, to seize the leader-ship, not to leave the party and found a new party. A recent Stalinist letter sent to "all Communists," in which they appeal to "all members desirous of unity to rally their actions for party unity and to achieve fighting shape," also tells us something of their main objective in the party.

In principle the party leadership is also promoting the same thing, party unity. So both factions seem to realize that two communist parties here in Finland would only result in more and more trouble and disputes. Nor are examples from elsewhere encouraging. A complete break would be the least wise thing to do.

It is just that the two factions have very different ideas on unity. The majority faction advocates compliance with party decisions and party discipline. The minority faction does not give a damn for them now. It wants to be a majority and would then demand even more unconditional discipline than the present majority.

In any party whatsoever the Stalinists' demand for a special party congress would be regarded as tragicomic: A congress would crush the party leadership. The present leadership will scarcely allow itself to be subjected to that humility. The idea does not fit in with the normal democratic way of thinking, nor does it in any way advance party unity, regarded by the factions as a downright end in itself, nor scarcely even support in the municipal elections.

Moderate CP Organ Comments

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 19 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial: "A Good Beginning"]

[Text] The SKP Central Committee meeting on Friday was optimistic in terms of atmosphere, full of appeals to active participation and healthily self-critical. Many who have long participated in Central Committee work declared that they had not seen an atmosphere like that in decades.

The best part of it was that many who put in an appearance at the meeting were able to in a concrete way report on the revival of party organization activities, the recruiting of new members and other concrete actions. The Central Committee enjoined the party to in the spirit of the party congress resolutions move in the direction of the timely struggle on behalf of a worker policy, actions to strengthen the municipal election campaign and to organize the 40th anniversary celebrations of the party's engagement in public activities and the founding of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League].

We know there are problems. The group that stayed out of the party leaders election is trying to add to them. Now it is, among other things, raising a row over the fact that the Central Committee has charged them with taking steps to organize party leadership tasks in a couple of districts. Since these districts declared war on the party congress resolutions, the Central Committee had no other way available to it than the one it chose.

Progress will depend on both the elected Central Committee's readiness to take the initiative and members.

Tampere Adopts Stalinist Line

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 20 Jun 84 p 8

[Text] Tampere (KU)—The last "moderate" features are disappearing from the leadership operations of the SKP's Tampere district organization. During its Monday evening session the district committee resolutely adopted the TIEDONANTAJA positions by a vote of 15 to 6.

The Tampere district managed to damn the party congress resolutions as early as at its special district conference as being opposed to "the majority of party members and supporters." During turns on the floor they also passed sentence on chairman Arvo Aalto and first secretary Aarno Aitamurto. They also announced that "our district organization's organ, TIEDONANTAJA, occupies a central position in the defense of party unity."

As a basis for discussion by the district committee, they then brought up the position adopted at the joint meeting of the eight Stalinist districts. In many speeches it was asserted to be "unwise" and "putting weapons into the hands of the moderates," so a subcommittee was given the job of formulating the districts's own justifications. The eight districts' joint resolutions were, however, endorsed by a majority decision. In those resolutions a special congress was demanded "to heighten the determination to fight" and to change the party leadership.

In a motion that was not passed it was maintained that the party congress had almost unanimously approved significant position papers. "Because of this insufficient substantive content to demand a special congress."

In the unsuccessful position they assumed they hoped for a continuation of cooperation beyond traditional factional dividing lines. The SKP Tampere district organization would also have asserted that the Hame YHTEISTYO is the only district organ. In organizational terms the work must be planned in accordance with rules and resolutions.

11,466 cso: 3617/188 ESTIER EXAMINES VALUE OF MITTERRAND TRIP TO MOSCOW

Paris L'UNITE in French 29 Jun 84 pp 12-13

[Article by Claude Estier: "The Three Kremlin Days"]

[Text] It is strange, this way in which certain commentators weigh a word, a gesture, a reaction, to establish whether or not the trip made to Moscow by Francois Mitterrand was useful or not, their conclusion, naturally, being dictated by the a priori information they had at the outset. And this is the source of a whole range of opinion, from "He shouldn't have gone" to "Good for him, he dared to do it!"

It was obvious that the greater part of the French press had decided to judge the trip on the basis of what the president of the republic would say or do for the Sakharov couple. The most honest newsmen had to admit that he did what he said he would, which was to make specific mention to all of the Soviet leaders meeting in the Kremlin of the violations of the Helsinki agreements of which the professor and his wife, who have been prevented from moving about and communicating with others, are victims. None of the Western statesmen who have visited Moscow to date have spoken directly enough. One had only to see the expression on the faces of the French president's hosts at that moment to realize that they did not like the kind of language they are not accustomed to hearing. "A courageous but useless act," some then said, because the TASS agency and PRAVDA censored that part of his speech. One would have had to be naive to imagine that the Soviet press would print such explosive statements in full. But in summarizing them in three lines, PRAVDA, which devoted almost two pages, with a large photograph, to a report of the talks that day, had to admit that Francois Mitterrand had "spoken in detail of the problem of the rights of man throughout the world." A seemingly enigmatic phrase, but clear enough for the very large number of Russian citizens who can read between the lines in their newspapers. The letter of thanks the daughter-in-law of Andrey Sakharov sent to the president of the republic provides additional proof, moreover, that his gesture was appreciated. Will it be possible to improve the lot of the Gorkiy exiles? That is another matter. But one can also pose the question otherwise: In what way would it have been better had Francois Mitterrand not gone to Moscow? In any case, I remember this statement by a "dissident" encountered during an earlier trip to the USSR: "We have no illusions about the usefulness of efforts from abroad, of which the Kremlin leaders are very intolerant. But the main thing is that people are talking about us, because the most frightening thing would be if we sank into oblivion." All the same, Francois Mitterrand did

not go to Moscow only to talk about the Sakharovs, Afghanistan or Poland, and this first resumption of contact at the summit after a 4-year interruption must be judged on many other levels.

A Message From Gromyko?

First of all, the level of East-West relations, and more particularly, nuclear weapons in Europe, was the main subject dealt with both in the meetings in plenary session and the 1.5-hour talk between the president of the republic and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Gromyko. The exchange which took place on this occasion did not bring forth, on basic issues, any notable changes either in the Soviet position, which continues to be one of throwing the responsibility for the failure of the Geneva talks and the resumption of escalation, in connection with the missile installation, on the Americans, or that of France, which Francois Mitterrand reasserted forcefully both with regard to the concept of nuclear balance, "the only response to the questions raised by the multiplications of weapons and risks," and on the subject of the French strike force, which could not be at issue in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, because it is on this factor that our independence and our security rest, and that which for France is "the only point which is not negotiable."

But beyond this reassertion of known positions, the president of the republic had the feeling, above all in the course of his interview with Andrey Gromyko, who proved "friendlier than expected," that the Soviets are trying to send a message: the withdrawal of the Pershing missiles independently installed in the FRG is no longer set forth specifically as a condition for the resumption of talks with the United States. Resumption of these talks is not however contemplated prior to the American elections in November, but everything appears as if the Soviets, more or less persuaded that Ronald Reagan will be elected, have already begun to test new proposals which would allow them, without losing face, to take the initiative toward the end of this year or the beginning of the next. In this connection, they have insisted less on their differences with France, which they continue to criticize for having supported the installation of the new NATO missiles, than on realms where shared positions could be found, whether it be a question of the prohibition on chemical or bacteriological weapons, for example, or, to an even greater extent, the problem of the militarization of space and the antisatellite weapons, both, from every evidence, being major concerns of the Soviets currently, to the extent that they reveal a clear lag behind the Americans in this realm. Out of what Francois Mitterrand said to them on this subject, as well as on measures for verifying disarmament, what they have stressed is the expression of positions close to theirs, which are in their eyes more important than the agreement also to be found in connection with the Near East, the war between Iraq and Iran, or the situation in Latin America. It would be foolhardy to conclude from this that the Kremlin has decided to give priority to dialogue with France, but the Soviet delegation was not unaffected by the phrase with which Francois Mitterrand concluded his first address: "It is for us to adapt history to the present circumstances, knowing that the first principle is that the USSR and France have much to do together."

Adapting history also sometimes means having it reenacted where it occurred. In this connection, the decision by Francois Mitterrand to go to Stalingrad and to confer the Legion of Honor on the city where, more than 40 years ago, the heroic battle which decided the fate of the war was fought was particularly appreciated by the Soviets, and to a great extent offset the irritation caused by the mention of the Sakharov situation. This is what the positive reports published by the press in Moscow in the days which followed the presidential visit seemed to confirm.

To turn now to bilateral Soviet-French relations, which, on the economic and trade levels have been almost totally blocked since the beginning of this year, might the trip to Moscow have made it possible to breathe new life into them? The second section of the Kremlin talks, devoted to this subject, was particularly formal, and it was difficult to conclude anything from it other than general impressions of good intentions. Minister of Foreign Trade Edith Cresson was able to stress that after the progress noted in 1983, which made it possible, thanks to the purchases of food and farm products by the Soviets, to reduce the French deficit by half, no major equipment contract was signed in the first 5 months of 1984, which was confirmed, moreover, by Charles Fiterman, where the particular realm of transportation is concerned. To this, First Deputy Chairman Arkhipov responded only with a flood of figures, but did not conceal the fact that the USSR had sought and found better credit conditions in Western countries other than France. Without a doubt it will be necessary for some time to pass in order to know whether or not the statement made in the speech by Konstantin Chernenko will be realized in fact or not. He indicated that the USSR has the political will to put Franco-Soviet trade back in balance, particularly by applying the sums obtained from the gas delivered to us, which threatens to aggravate the French deficit, to an increase of Soviet purchases from France.

Thus it is very clear that on a number of points, only the future, but perhaps the near future, will make it possible to judge the usefulness of a trip which, in any cases, was necessary, and which developed in every respect as Francois Mitterrand had hoped and which again has won praise from all of the Western partners of France.

These three days of Kremlin meetings served, in addition, to provide information, or at the very least a series of impressions, about the current state of the regime in the USSR. A first fact became clear to all those who participated in the talks: Konstantin Chernenko, who has presided over the fated Soviet Union since the month of February, is a man in poor health. He walks with some difficulty, and merely reads the text of his statements (he remained in his seat to read his toast at the dinner on Thursday evening).

Sometimes his face breaks into a broad smile at this or that remark from his interlocutor, and he is sometimes wont to respond with a verbal sally. But beyond what is written out in advance, he has little to say on basic problems. On the international policy issues which formed the basic content of the talks, Andrey Gromyko clearly appeared to be in charge of affairs, whereas for economic questions, this appeared to the role for two other first deputy chairmen, Aliyev and Arkhipov.

As to Mikhail Gorbachev, he did not participate in the talks and Francois Mitterrand only met him during the dinner at the Kremlin, where he occupied the place assigned by protocol to the Soviet No 2 man. Of the exchange which occurred on this occasion, in which Claude Cheysson also participated, it appeared that the younger son of the Politburo, who seemed moreover to be sorry not to have had an opportunity for a more direct meeting with the president of the republic, discussed problems in terms clearly left stereotyped than those used by his colleagues. If something changes in Moscow one day, it indeed appears, as we noted moreover in these columns just after the funeral ceremonies for Andropov, that it will come from that quarter.

5157 CSO: 3519/428 EXCLUSIVELY EUROPEAN DEFENSE SEEN AS SOVIET GOAL

Paris LE JOURNAL DU PARLEMENT in French 1-15 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by Suzanne Labin: "What Are the Goals of Those Pulling the Strings in the Pacifist Movements?"]

[Text] The negative elements and the disruption of talks followed by threats show that the "pacifist campaigns" which the Soviets finance and support here in our country are designed not to establish a just weapons balance nor to reduce the crushing burden they impose on the standard of living of the working masses, nor even to safeguard peace, but rather to deceive the gallery while they increase their world hegemony on all levels with a view to subjecting the free world.

On the Military Level

The main goal of these campaigns is to give the democratic leaders a bad conscience so that they will disarm, at the very time their sworn enemy boldly overarms.

The second goal is to destroy the Atlantic pact by setting the European countries against the United States. The trick is to get the brave Europeans to believe that America is threatening their security with its Euromissiles and will plunge them into war. The purpose of Moscow is (to use the strategists' terminology), to "uncouple" Europe from the United States, the better to neutralize it first, to "Finlandize" its next, and finally to make it a satellite. At least this is what the Soviets hope to do, and it is what the statement by their minister of foreign affairs, Mr Gromyko, bears out. It is the statement which gives one shivers. "After all, Western Europe lives under the same roof as we do." As against the umbrella of the evil Americans, Gromyko offers us the roof of the delightful gulag camps.

Moscow's third goal is to separate Germany from NATO--that economically powerful, politically democratic Germany which is nonetheless dependent militarily on the Atlantic alliance, by forcing it to wait for reunification with East Germany until it agrees to neutrality.

The fourth goal of the general staff in Moscow is to promote "neutralism" in Western Europe. This movement has already taken its toll in Scandinavia, in Holland, which has refused the Euromissiles, in the FRG and in Greece. While on the communist side, aggressive attacks multiply (Afghanistan, Lebanon,

Angola, Kampuchea, El Salvador), a state of mind ready for any concession, for any surrender, any act of treachery is spreading among the democracies.

However our pacifists deceive themselves dangerously if they think that they can ward off the dangers of war and the military burden by urging their country to become neutral. For neutrality has never prevented a nation from being invaded and annexed. This is what has happened twice to unfortunate Belgium. These brainless pacifists do not understand that if a country is not prepared to defend its neutrality, weapons in hand, and by guaranteeing a strong military service, as the Swiss and the Swedes do, it risks being crushed by the invader much more than do the committed and equipped nations.

A fifth goal of the general staff in Moscow is to create belief in the possibility of an exclusively European defense. This idea gains greater acceptance to the extent that it panders to the rampant anti-Americanism which the crypto-Soviets have always encouraged. In addition, it seems less defeatist and unrealistic than unilateral disarmament, in the eyes of European patriots, and this only makes it the more dangerous.

In fact, this idea of a totally European defense is entirely utopian. General Close reminded "dreamers and visionaries of all hues" of what a European defense deprived of American aid would mean in practice. This would mean for Europe resumption of the following colossal obligations: the replacement of more than 300,000 American soldiers who are engaged in the defense of Central Europe, the burdensome protection of maritime communications lines between the old and the new continents, the lightning reinforcement of the armies to a million men in wartime, increasing the strategic nuclear potential, utilization of all the tactical nuclear weapons, deployment on its own of the Euromissiles, to balance the SS-20s, and protection of the vital European interests in the peripheral zones which the Atlantic Treaty does not coverthe Middle East, in the energy sector, and the southern African area for essential raw materials.

A minimum of good sense and good faith suffices to make clear the considerable financial implications of a resumption, by Europe, of all of the obligations currently being carried out by our American ally. Our defense budgets would have as a result to be more than doubled. Now no European country, however patriotic it may claim to be, is ready to agree to such enormous sacrifices to guarantee the security of an autonomous Europe.

This demand for a purely European defense is bluster. It is certainly more subtle than the demand for unilateral disarmament, but in deceiving the public more readily, it does more harm. Without the American alliance, free Europe no longer exists.

5157 CSO: 3519/428

Takung dipengan berajak di berajak Menjapan dengan berajak di berajak POLITICAL GREECI

PASOK TACTICAL ERRORS SEEN ENDANGERING DEMOCRATIC FUTURE

Athens I AVGI in Greek 3 Jun 84 p 2

 \sqrt{A} rticle by Levteris Mavroeidi $\overline{s7}$

/Text/ If the old and well-known phrase of Napoleon that 'whoever wins the war commits the fewer errors" applies to politics, one could say the Right in our country has lost forever because its very existence and activity is a great error. Its basic goal is to cut off our country's course toward Change, to go back to situations of political and social models of life which are historically obsolete and which have led to tragic national misfortunes.

But such a thing would be too good to be true. The Right, however historically obsolete it may be, and although it lost in 1981 a battle of tremendous significance, has not ceased to be a very strong political, economic, and social force, always present in the country, fighting a force which challenges every step to the Change and claims without compromise its return to the paradise of power--a paradise only partly lost.

Precisely for this reason certain significant errors the PASOK government has committed and insists on continuing, cause serious dangers not only for PASOK and its further political career, but more broadly, for the country's democratic course.

First mistake. It is certainly a basic tactical error that PASOK accepted the ND challenge for a contest across the board, thus subscribing to the characterization of this contest as a "primary election" for the country's further political development.

By accepting this challenge--although it had no valid reason to do so--PASOK thrust the country too soon into the whirlpool of a comprehensive political conflict, one and a half years before the end of the 4-year parlimentary term, thus narrowing the time given by the people for the implementation of its program. Moreover, it placed itself in front of dilemnas it had no reason to accept.

Second mistake. It opened and continues to conduct the electoral fight on the basis of a "duel" between PASOK and ND, which clearly favors the Right since the Right goes to this confrontation with virtually all its forces, while PASOK is isolated from the other democratic forces of the Change and narrows the front of the anti-Right.

It is clear that this mistake derives from the notion of hegemonism in the democratic movement, a notion which possibly satisfies—although not certainly—party expediencies, but it deprives the cause of Change of very significant possibilities.

It limits—to the extent that it will succeed in limiting the presence of the other democratic parties—the possibility to shrink the Right in the election to its natural extent of 30 to 35 percent, but also $\overline{/it}$ limits $\overline{/}$ the great advantages offered by a pluralistic democratic political system to the progress of the "third road" to socialism.

Third mistake. $/\overline{P}ASOK/$ was not able to set barriers to the systematic effort of the Right to exacerbate the political climate, which of course was by definition difficult from the moment it accepted the approach of a duel and of polarization. And as we move closer to the election the climate becomes increasingly exacerbated, causing more general dangers.

This means that the Right succeeded in drawing PASOK into joining the battle, not only where /the Right/ wanted but also in forms which favor the Right. Of course, this is not the first time the Right resorted to methods of unrest and destabilization in order to cut off the course of our political affairs toward the direction of Change.

The unrest is food for the Right. The duty of the democratic forces, the duty of a democratic government, is to put a decisive barrier to the exacerbation of the political climate, to isolate politically the forces which promote it, to render politically harmful for the Right this effort.

The PASOK government, moving where the Right prefers to wage the battle, seems to have misinterpreted in some way the meaning and the extent of the popular vote of 18 October 1981. It appears to believe that the masses who voted for it $\overline{P}ASOK$ are ready to follow it everywhere, whatever road it takes, either by its own choice or by being trapped by other forces.

This is a tremendous mistake, for which our country's democratic movement has paid in the past a heavy price.

Such an interpretation of the popular vote seems to be connected to the tragic error committed by at least a section of PASOK cadres who see PASOK as the owner, in fact the permanent owner, of state power, instead of a political party enlisted in the course of Change--the Change which in no way can be the cause of a single party.

If the mistakes noted here can be seen as tactical errors, the major strategic error of PASOK is the theoretical notion of National Popular Unity, which leads to the wrong conclusion that a party with 48 percent--doubtful that it still has--can move on to socialism.

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CSO:3521/262

AMBIVALENCE OF LEFT'S POSITIONS POINTED OUT

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 13 Jun 84 p 4

/Article by Giannis Lampsas: "Our 'Enemies' Will Save Us"/

/Text/ I have a friend who is very anti-American, anti-European, and generally anti-Western. He has not told me how he is going to vote in the Euroelections but I suppose he is vacillating between PASOK and KKE/Interior. We often talk about the political situation and he always defends the "democratic forces," while I, naturally, support the "reactionary" theses of free economy and the friendship with the West.

"What worries me most," I said recently, "is the possibility that Turkey may take advantage of the polarization that has developed in our country."

My "progressive" friend looked at me with compassion. "You have great illusions about international affairs. Do you really think the Turks have independent policies? Don't you know they are pawns of American policy?"

"And why do you think America will not encourage Turkey to make a show of force?"

'Because it is not in the interest of the Americans to unite the Greeks behind Andreas Papandreou; and because it is not in their interest to break up NATO completely by getting Greeks and Turks to fight each other."

"All right...but if, God forbid, they decide one fine morning that Greece is a burden, that she is an obstacle to the Middle East strategy, and shift all their support to Turkey, leaving us alone to face the Turkish claims and threats?"

"Impossible! They need Greece as much as they need Turkey...The Americans will never abandon Greece!"

I saw that he was getting upset and was really worried. So I made another observation...

"I am also thinking about the economy. With the anti-Western policy we follow, with the war Andreas has declared against private initiative, I am afraid that very soon we won't have enough money to pay even the public servants!"

Again he looked at me with compassion, my progressive friend.

"You forget that we are members of the European Economic Community," he said proudly.

"The EEC of the monopolies," I asked with fake naivete. "What can anyone expect from the multinationals and the rich and greedy North?"

"Look, in the long run, EEC is harmful for us, but in the meantime it helps our socialist government to overcome certain difficult moments inherited from the Right."

"And if they get tired of helping us and force us to leave?"

My friend got upset again.

"Don't worry; they are not going to let us leave. They need us, to grab our agricultural products, the sweat of our farmers..."

"I don't understand how you expect our economy to be saved by those who steal us blind...But I have another question. What will happen if tomorrow, in the Euroelections, PASOK gets so few votes that they find it necessary to join forces with KKE to continue governing the country? Aren't you afraid of this?"

'Why should I be afraid? They are both democratic forces; they will find a way to work together..."

"The communists will certainly ask for ministries..." This possibility did not seem to be to his liking.

"Again you are misinformed! The Americans have never allowed communists to get basic ministries in any government in Western Europe. You think they'll make an exception in our case?"

"I understand," I said. "EEC will support our economy, the Americans will check the Turks, while you and KKE will shout 'out with EEC,' and 'out with the Americans.'"

7520 CSO 3521/271 POLITICAL GREECE

COUNTRY'S POLITICAL IMMATURITY VIS-A-VIS WEST REGRETTED

Government Anti-Clericalism

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 14 Jun 84 p 5

/Article by Jpyros Alexiou/

/Text/ The Vatican is not afraid to speak candidly and to show that it is not influenced and does not move guided by narrow interests and indeed those dictated by circumstances. Strong proof of this is the position of Pope John Paul II on Monday as soon as it was announced that the great Italian political leader Enrico Berlinguer was dead. In contrast to tradition, the Pope authorized the Bishop of Padova to convey his condolences to the family of the deceased.

Before we say exactly what we have in mind with regard to the gesture of the Pope and the death of Berlinguer, we quote Dim. Deiolanis in TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS: 'Most people know only that he married 30 years ago in Rome and that his wife Letitsia is a faithful Catholic going regularly to church. In her only interview in 1976, she explained, however, that both herself and her children were party members.' And he goes on: 'His three daughters studied at the aristocratic Catholic school Marymount of Rome.'

Many have tried from time to time to analyze or simply to present the relations between christianity and Marxism. In our humble opinion this phenomenon, and it is indeed a phenomenon, exists only in Italy, the country of softness and civilization, where even disputes become fun. We are not unaware that at this moment your mind goes to the Red Brigades to use their illustration to counter our argument. Yes, but this fruit of terrorism was imported from abroad and for this reason it did not do well in the moderate climate of Italy. If such a raid had taken place elsewhere there would have been many victims primarily from reprisals. In any event, this is another subject. We want to extoll here the grandeur of this coexistence between Marxism and worship, communism and christianity.

Just think. The wife of the leader of the Italian communist party is a declared christian, a devout Catholic; his children were brought up with the teachings of christian education and nobody was raising questions. Neither was the party faithful annoyed, nor did the christians consider this a

provacation to their beliefs.

In Italy no one is mystified by the double identity of the christian and the communist, as in the case of Mrs. Berlinguer. The leftists there do not make a display of anti-clerical hatred, nor are they afraid to say they believe in God. Now bring something like this to our country. But we said that in Italy everything is done with politeness. There have been films and plays critical of the church and especially of the clergy. But even this anti-clericalism is distinguished by its decency. They do not have the color of ours. The Italian works deals most of the time with existing situations and they are trying to correct them. Here we see something else. We see an effort to satisfy the basest tastes of the audience with disgusting statements and lies trying to hit the church as though it were an enemy. What can we say...Let us hope that at some point we, too, will become truly European.

Lack of Character Bemoaned

Athens ETHNOS TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 10 Jun 84 p 2

 $\overline{/\text{Text/}}$ Two events in the last few days painfully reminded us (at least those who insist on thinking in this country of miracles) how low our public ethics are here.

The Euroelections, which allow traumatic comparisons between the Greek democracy and the democracy of the "Nine" partners...the "idiotic Franks," and the illness of Berlinguer--the secretary general of the communist party of Italy--which gave an opportunity to show the ethos of the public in our neighboring country.

With regard to the Euroelections and the campaign mobilizations, the comparisons bring shame and awe:

Here (in this "clever" Grecia), the political underdevelopment, the partisan arbitrariness, and sly tricks, the anti-democratic actions and omissions, the cheap and harmful populism, the littering and the chaos...

Over there (in the "stupid" Frankia), the political maturity, the party discipline, the legality, the respect for democratic rules, the democratic ethos, the cleanliness, the order...

Here (in the country of the 'wise guys"), in the name of democracy, we had the cheap buntings, the poster mania, the rudeness, the various (legalistic or not) "tricks" to steal the vote...

There (in the countries of the "dullards"), in the name of democracy they had democracy, the printed and televised dialogue, the respect for the constant political rules and the wise avoidance of fanaticism and extremism...

With regard to the sudden illness of Enrico Berlinguer and the reactions of the

political leaders in Italy, the moderate Greek citizens (fortunately there are some left!) feel--at the slightest comparison--deep regrets...Because it is true that the bigotry has receded in our country; it is true that the past extremism and fanaticism have been toned down; it is true that here, too, we have the first steps of reconciliation and coexistence among the various political groups...yet...

That the aged president of the Italian Republic Pertini goes to see the ailing communist leader and spends hours at his side is not only reconciliation, it is ethos, too...

That the vice premier of the Italian government Forlani goes and spends hours at the side of the communist leader is not mere expediency, it is ethos, too...

That the chairman of the Christian Democratic Party Piccoli goes and spends the night at the side of the communist leader is not merely a toast to the policy of coexistence, it is ethos, too.

That Premier Craxi was calling from London, where he happened to be, every hour on the hour to find out about the course of the communist leader's illness is not only an act of friendship, it is ethos, too.

That the entire political leadership of Italy leans over the pillow of Berlinguer does not merely underline their political maturity but their ethos as well.

And this political maturity (shown by the Europeans on the Euroelections) and this political ethos (shown by the Italians on Berlinguer) are the virtues we miss--and we envy--more these days.

Will we ever acquire them, too?

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TALKS WITH ALBANIA TO START IN JUNE

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/Text/ Greek-Albanian talks will begin in June on settling unsolved problems which exist and affect the development of relations between Athens and Tirana. Committee of the Commit

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Albanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kapland will arrive in Athens for this purpose, heading a delegation from his country.

A news release referring to the time of Greek-Albanian talks added that in yesterday's meeting between Associate Foreign Minister Papoulias with the Albanian Ambassador to Athens Nousi "the mutual desire for the all-around development of Greek-Albanian relations was reaffirmed."

Among the subjects to be discussed is that of the protection of the rights of Greeks who live in Albania.

Other subjects: The formal end of the state of war which exists between the two countries since 1941; the exchange of visits by citizens of the two countries without limitations; the border traffic, since Albania continues to keep her borders to Greece closed; and the further development of Greek-Albanian relations.

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Personal Company of March 1997

POLITICAL GREECE

BIOGRAPHIES OF NEW PASOK EURO-DEPUTIES

Athens EXORMISI in Greek 8 Jun 84 p 16

/Text7

1. GEORGIOS MAVROS was born on the border island of Kastellorizo in 1909 and studied law at the universities of Athens and Berlin. He received his Ph.D. at the University of Athens and was a professor of international private law.

Career: He entered politics in 1945 at the end of the war. He was elected deputy 10 times (in the elections of 1946, 1950, 1951, 1956, 1958, 1961, 1963, 1964, 1974, and 1977).

He participated in all post-war centrist governments as minister of justice (1945), education (1946), commerce and industry (1949), finance (1951), national defense (1952), and coordination (1963 and 1964).

Following the fall of the dictatorship he participated in the 1974 National Unity Government as vice-premier and minister of foreign affairs. In this capacity he led the Greek delegation at the Geneva negotiations on Cyprus and participated in the U.N. General Assembly in September 1974.

In 1974 he was elected chairman of the Center Union Party and in this capacity he became the major opposition leader during the years 1974-1977. In November 1980 he founded the Central Front Party, of which he is still chairman. In 1981 he was elected first deputy-at-large with PASOK.

2. MANOLIS GLEZOS was born in Apeiranthos of Naxos in 1922 and studied in the Supreme School of Economic and Commercial Sciences /ASOEE/. During the Nazi occupation period he was very and variously active in the youth liberation organizations (Federation of Greek Communist Youth /OKNE/, National Liberation Front /EAM/, and the National Panhellenic Youth Organization /EPON/). Thus, together with Apostolos Sandas, a law student, he was sentenced to death by the German occupation authorities because they brought down the Third Reich flag in May 1941 which was flying on the Akropolis.

On 24 March 1942 he and Sandas were arrested by the German occupation forces and were held in the Averof prison where Glezos was tortured inhumanly with the result that he contracted a serious form of tuberculosis.

On 3 March 1948 he was arrested, indicted and sentenced several times, once to death (October 1948) for "press crimes" and once again to death on 21 March 1949 for violating Resolution Three. The death penalty was not carried out because of strong protests by the Greek people and world public opinion.

In the 9 September 1951 election, while in jail, he was elected Athens deputy for the EDA party.

On 21 April 1967 he was arrested and, together with other political leaders, he was held at Goudi, then at Pikermi, then at General Security, Yiaros, Partheni Lerou, and finally at Oropos from where he was released in 1971. In his life he has been imprisoned a total of 16 years.

In 1981 he was Athens deputy on the PASOK ticket.

3. PARASKEVAS AVGERINOS was born in Arkadia in 1927. He studied medicine at the University of Athens.

He has been an active cadre in the syndicalist organization of the physicians even prior to the dictatorship and was always distinguished for his ethos and fighting convictions.

During the occupation he joined EAM and fought in its ranks against the conquerors, engaging in memorable resistance activities.

He is a PASOK founding member, for years a member of the Central Committee and of the party's Executive Bureau, with responsibilities in the area of economics.

In the government of Change he served as minister of health and welfare and then as minister without portfolio in matters of health.

4. SPYROS PLASKOVITIS was born in Kerkyra in 1919. He was a professional jurist in the Council of State where he reached the rank of counsellor. In 1968 he was arrested by the junta because of his participation in resistance activities, exiled to Kasos, sentenced by the Extraordinary Court Martial of Athens to 5 years in prison; dismissed from his judicial post. Following the fall of the dictatorship he returned to the Council and was promoted retroactively to counsellor. He resigned in 1977 in protest following the acquittal of the generals responsible for the massacre of Polytekheion.

In the 1977 election he was elected first deputy-at-large of PASOK and in 1981 Eurodeputy. He represents PASOK in the European Parliament and the Socialist Group, while at the same time he was elected vice-chairman of the Socialist Group.

Side by side with his public activities, he appeared early in literature as one of the best prose writers of the post-war generation.

5. GRIGORIS VARFIS was born in Athens in 1927. He is a graduate of the Athens Law School. He did postgraduate studies on law and economics in Paris and he worked for a period of time as a journalist on French radio.

He was responsible for drafting the OECD economic reports since 1963. In 1964 he was appointed to the permanent Greek delegation to the EEC as economic advisor, following the signing of the association treaty.

He remained abroad until the fall of the junta when he returned and was appointed to take charge of the General Directorate on relations with the EEC within the then Ministry of Coordination.

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He joined PASOK in 1979 as a member of the Committee of Analysis and Planning. He participated in drafting the PASOK Program on Common Market Questions.

The government of Change appointed him deputy foreign minister on EEC and questions. He remained in that post until early 1984.

6. NIKOS VGENOPOULOS was born in Patras. He is a physician. He studied at the Athens Medical School and graduated with top honors with specialization in cardiology and internal medicine. He has been elected at times vice president and secretary general of the Athens Medical Association.

With considerable resistance activity as a member of PAK-Interior he was arrested in 1970 and convicted by the extraordinary court martial.

A founding member of PASOK, he was twice elected deputy for Akhaia nome in 1974 and 1977; while in the 1981 election he was elected Eurodeputy.

He is a member of the PASOK Central Committee from the Panhellenic conference and he was re-elected by the Congress.

Between 1977 and 1981 he was secretary of the PASOK parliamentary working group on social services.

7. KHRISTOS PAPOUTSIS was born in Larisa in 1953. He is an economist by profession, a graduate of the economics section of Athens University Law School.

He became a leading personality in the student movement because of his intensive activities in the law school and in the Student Organization /EFEE/. In 1977 he became a member of the EFEE Central Council for the first time and in the following year he was elected chairman of the EFEE Central Council until 1980.

"我们,我们还是我们的人,我们们们的,我们也没有一个都是我看着不

He is a member of the Supreme National Council on Education where he represents PASOK.

He has been a member of the Movement since 1974 as a member of the Koliatsou local organization, while previously during the junta he was active in the

anti-dictatorial struggle of the student movement. In 1976 he became a member of the Youth Committee and between 1977 and 1981 he was alternate secretary of the PASOK Youth.

He was elected to the PASOK Central Committee by the 1977 Panhellenic Conference and again by the party Congress.

In 1981 he became a member of the Executive Secretariat and from December 1982 to the present serves as secretary of the Organizational Committee.

8. NIKOLAOS GAZIS is a lawyer with studies at the Universities of Athens, Paris and New York. He is a former minister and was elected national deputy in 1974 on the EDIK ticket.

He took part in the committee for the revision of the constitution in 1974 and has served as deputy governor of the National Bank. He was special legal advisor to the Greek delegation to the San Francisco conference and a member of the Greek delegation which negotiated the Greek association with the EEC.

He was also a member of the intraparliamentary conferences in London and Madrid and official representative in the negotiations for settling the prewar national debt and he signed the related treaties with the American, British, French and Swedish bond holders.

9. GIORGIOS ROMAIOS was born in 1934 in Kerkyra. He is a graduate of the Superior School of Economics and Commerce but is a journalist by profession. An active syndicalist cadre of journalists, he was elected vice chairman of the Union of Editors of Athenian Dailies during 1976-1978.

During the Papadopoulos junta he participated in the anti-dictatorial struggle in the ranks of PAK. For his activities he was arrested and jailed by the military police and later imprisoned in Korydalos.

After the fall of the junta he joined PASOK and worked as a cadre in the area of the press.

For several years he was political editor of VIMA where he worked continuously from 1960 until 1981. He served as chief editor at VIMA and later as publisher of the VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS.

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In October 1981 he was appointed by the government of Change to be director general of radio-TV /ERT/

10. KONSTANTINA PANTAZI-TZIFA was born in Patras and is a graduate of the School of Interpreters of the University of Geneva. She has worked professionally as a journalist, either as an editor of EXORMISI (1976-1979) or as an editor of ETHNOS during the dictatorship until the closing down of the newspaper.

In November 1967 she was arrested by the military police for her resistance activities as a member of the organization DEKA. After the return of democracy she joined PASOK. She is a member of the PASOK Foreign Relations Committee and a founding member of the Union of Greek Women.

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She was elected a Eurodeputy on the PASOK ticket in the 1981 election.

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ALLEGED MISTREATMENT OF WESTERN THRACE MUSLIMS

East Burnham ARABIA: THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English No 35, Jul 84 pp 75-77

[Article by Dr. S. R. Sonyel: "Muslims in Greece--the Forgotten 'Alien Elements'"]

[Text]

Western Thrace, in the Balkan peninsula at the extreme northeastern corner of Greece, is part of a larger territory divided among Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. It consists of three administrative areas, Xanthi (Iskece), with its capital at Xanthi, Rhodope, with its capital at Komotini (Gumulcine) and Evros, with its capital at Alexandropolis (Dedeagae).

This is the region in which a Turkish Muslim minority was allowed to remain during the compulsory population exchanges between Turkey and Greece after the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923. At the time, the Muslim population in the area formed the majority, outnumbering the Greeks by four to one, inhabiting 300 villages, and possessing 84 per cent of the land; but owing to the oppression of successive Turkish governments, the Muslims, particularly of the Province of Evros, have been uprooted from their homes and transplanted around Xanthi and Komotini.

The destiny of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace was entrusted to Greece by the Treaty of Lausanne by which Greece undertook to extend to the Muslim minority the same treatment and security it would accord to other Greek citizens, and to recognise as fundamental law the rights conferred upon that community.

These solemn pronouncements have remained on paper while Greek leaders have followed an oppressive policy of uprooting the Muslim minority from its homeland, through discrimination and harassment. The Muslim population has now dwindled from about 130,000 to 120,000, while its land ownership has dropped from 84 per cent to 40 per cent.

The Greek Nationality Law Number 3370 of 1955 has dealt a heavy blow to the Muslim minority of Western Thrace. According to section 19 of that law, a person of non-Greek ethnic origin who leaves Greece without the intention of returning, may lose his Greek nationality. This also applies to a person of non-Greek ethnic origin born and domiciled abroad. Minors living abroad may also be declared as having lost Greek nationality if both of their parents, or the surviving parent, have lost their nationality.

Thus, if you are a Muslim, living in Western Thrace, your Greek citizenship is only good for paying taxes, serving in the army and for all the other obligations imposed upon a loyal citizen; but as you are a person of non-Greek origin, when you travel abroad, you are under the constant threat of being deprived of your Greek citizenship.

Is this compatible with Article 3 of Protocol 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights? How can the Republic of Greece, a full member of the European Economic Community, indulge in such oppressive policies against a helpless minority, and then have the audacity to pose as the champion of democracy and human rights? And this is not all.

According to a motion tabled on March 7, 1983 by European MPs, John David Taylor and Ian Paisley, in the European Parliament, the Muslim community of Western Thrace is being denied many basic liberties enjoyed by the rest of the Greek population. They are forced to live in dilapidated accommodation, mostly in abject poverty. The Euro-MPs deplored the treatment accorded to the Muslim community by successive Greek governments, and called upon the EEC to investigate the matter, and to suggest ways of eradicating the existing social deprivation.

Another limitation imposed on a great section of the Muslim minority is the restriction of their freedom of movement. A large portion of Western Thrace has been declared a restricted zone, as a result of which about 30,000 Muslims have been forced to live in an open-air penitentiary as many Muslim villages and towns are within this zone, the boundaries of which are expanded at will. Muslims living in this zone must carry special permits, issued by the military commander of the area, before they can be allowed to leave the area.

The Muslims are not allowed to acquire new real estate, or even to repair old houses, by virtue of Greek Law Number 1366/1938. They can only obtain permission to sell their property to Orthodox Greeks, who are helped by Greek banks, including the central bank, with credit to buy such property. Greek authorities also deny to Muslims motor vehicle and tractor licences. Their agricultural lands are confiscated for "industrial and other public purposes," while the non-arable lands of Greek Orthodox citizens are spared.

Eight Muslim villagers from Inhanli (Evialon) have each been sent to prison for one year, and five other villagers of Kustafcova (Miki) for two years each on the pretext of cultivating fields claimed to be "state property." These arable fields have been cultivated for years by the same villagers who possess the title deeds. Many other Muslims have met a similar fate.

The Muslims have lost more than half of their lands during the last 60 years through confiscations. These were not only private property belonging to them, but also real estate holdings of Muslim religious foundations. Muslim Wakfs came under

serious threat in recent years through the legislative acts of the Greek government. These religious endowments are the backbone of the Muslim minority. The Greek government began to erode the autonomy of the Wakfs as early as 1930 (Law Number 2345/1930), and went further in 1980 when Law Number 1091/ 1980 turned the Wakfs into ordinary associations.

This law restricts the administration of Wakfs to five persons to be elected by the Greek governor of the province. It prevents the candidacy of those who have been deprived of their civil rights for political reasons, for example community leaders such as the Muftis and members of parliament. The implementation of the law is by government decree and is thus open to political fluctuations. The Wakf budget has to be approved by the governor.

The income of those Wakfs, which hitherto has been allocated to minority schools, now goes to the ministry of education. But the coup de grace is given by section 20 which supersedes all others in this respect, and by virtue of which the Wakfs must apply to the ministry of finance and present, inter alia, documents pertaining to their title deeds. Those that fail to do so lose their status. The number of Wakfs still holding the necessary certificates and documents dating from Ottoman times cannot be many, because these age-old institutions have suffered numerous foreign occupations and one civil war since 1878.

The Muslims of Western Thrace are also oppressed with regard to their language, which is Turkish, and their education, contrary to the Treaty of Lausanne. They can neither establish, nor manage, nor control, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education. The Greek government has flagrantly violated its treaty obligations by eroding the autonomy of the Muslim minority through legislation which has subjected their education to the will of the Greek authorities, who have now the right to appoint school administrators and teachers, and decide on the curriculum.

Many of the 240 Muslim primary schools, catering for about 12,000 pupils. consist of unified classes from the 1st to the 6th form, in a single classroom. Those who graduate from these schools must find a place in only two secondary schools,

which is well nigh impossible. This means that the education of many Muslim children must end when they finish their primary school. Hardly any Muslim student has ever succeeded in entering a Greek university.

About 200 Muslim teachers employed in these schools are not selected by the Muslim community, but are appointed by the Greek authorities. More than 200 Muslim teachers have either been dismissed or not given work at all. Moreover, Muslim schools are without proper textbooks, because of the rigid censorship exercised by the Greek authorities. On the other hand, textbooks used in Greek primary and secondary schools are full of hatred and enmity towards Muslims.

When the Muslims of the village of Simandra (Karacanlar) demanded their rights, their primary school was closed in 1982 for a whole year. When they tried to reopen their school, their action was countered by military force, followed by indiscriminate beating of all the villagers and the detention of two Muslims, who were later sent to prison for two years each. In September 1983 the Muslim primary schools in the villages of Agiohorion (Hacikoy) and Mikro Orfanó (Kucuk Oksuzler) met with the same fate, and to this day they remain closed and sealed by the Greek authorities.

In November 1983 a court sentence was passed against four Muslim youth and teachers' associations following legal proceedings initiated by the governor of Rhodope and Xanthi, forcing them to remove their signboards which carried the word "Turkish" in their titles. The signboards were actually removed by a group of Greek security officers commanded by gendarmerie officers.

Notices have been issued to the villages of Komotini, inhabited by Muslims, demanding the removal of loudspeakers from their mosques, and a campaign of psychological pressure and intimidation has been launched in the local Greek press against the Muslims, portraying them as undesirable, alien elements.

At Sahin (Ehinos), in the Province of Iskece, a first lieutenant in the Greek army, Zuchos Eleftherios, is reported to have warned the Muslims as follows: "We will give the right of life on this soil to those who are Greek and Orthodox (Christians). If you want to prove that you are true citizens, we want to see a cross on your chests."

The situation of the Muslims in the socalled "restricted area" is most alarming. The population, declares Professor Ketteni, director-general of the OIC subsidiary Islamic Foundation for Science and Technology, is poor and imams are non-existent. Their relations with Islam are on the verge of being broken. Hundreds of mosques have been demolished or converted for other uses. The situation of the Muslims outside Western Thrace is already in a state of complete decay, and the survival of the Muslim community is in serious danger.\ Even in Western Thrace, where international agreements protect the Muslims, the attitude of the Greek government seems to be one of continuous administrative and moral pressure to force them into emigration.

Religious persecution is widespread. Teachers are not allowed to come from abroad; Muslim orphans are Christianised; Mustis are suffering from legal persecutions; some religious offices are abolished; mosques are left to decay; many of them are destroyed, and the Muslims are not allowed to repair them. Christian proselytism is widespread and churches are built even in villages where there are no Christian inhabitants.

The Greeks have occupied the Wakf foundations of Gazi Evranos Pasha, in Komotini (Gumulcine), and the property of the Imanet mosque; they have desecrated the mausoleum of Gazi Evranos in Yenice; burnt down the central mosque of Iskece; demolished the Tabakhane mosque and replaced it by a dancing hall; while the minaret of Buyuk Musalla mosque is used by Greek soldiers for target practice.

Dimotika, which had 12 mosques, now has only one. The rest have been destroyed, together with the Muslim schools and pious foundations. In Dedeagac, a mob destroyed a mosque and the Muslim school. The cemeteries of the Muslim community have been ruined by the Christians in most cities and towns. In short, the Muslim community of Greece is faced with danger of extinction.

Following the declaration of independence by the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, the Greek authorities are reported to have stepped up their campaign of harassment and pressure against the Muslim population of Western Thrace. Officials of the Greek ministry of finance go round the shops run by Muslims and fine them on flimsy excuses. Muslim houses are attacked, but the police prefer

to take no notice. Greek villagers are emboldened to requisition Muslim fields and to cultivate them forcibly without the permission of their owners.

In order to stop the persecution of the Muslims of Greece, it is necessary that the Muslim world, especially the Arab countries, and pan-Islamic organisations should show an interest in the survival of the Muslim community of Greece as free citizens without persecution or harassment. As Professor Ketteni reminds us, Allah (Subhanahu wa Ta'ala) said in the Holy Quran, "And if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of entire humanity" (Surah 5, Ayat 35).

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POLITICAL GREECE

PAPANDREOU-KARAMANLIS MEETING FOCUSES ON ELECTIONS

Presidential, Parliamentary Elections

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 17 Jul 84 p 1

 $\sqrt{\text{Text/}}$ A very important meeting "on all topics" will be held today at noon between President K. Karamanlis and Prime Minister A. Papandreou. The meeting, to be held at 12:30 pm at the Astera Hotel in Vouliagmeni, will be followed by a luncheon, a fact that suggests a long discussion between the two top officials of the nation. The seriousness of the meeting is suggested by the fact that the prime minister wants to bring up two determining issues of a political nature: (a) the new electoral law and (b) the intentions of the chief of state in connection with the timing of the next parliamentary elections.

It has been heard that Mr Papandreou will brief the president of the republic on the latest developments on foreign issues that relate particularly to Greek-American relations and on possible developments on outstanding Greek issues with NATO.

As PASOK circles observe, the seriousness of the meeting is attributed to the prime minister's intention to bring up domestic issues connected with the timing of the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. As these same circles maintain, with the opening of the new parliamentary session during the first 10 days of October, Mr Papandreou is tending to bring up the electoral law as one of the first pieces of legislation. Consequently, it is natural that Mr Papandreou will plead before the chief of state his pre-electoral promise for the establishment of "a simple proportional electoral system" and will want to sound out Mr Karamanlis on his intentions in this sensitive issue. Besides, the president's firm stance on the advisability of a reinforced proportional electoral system is well-known. The latter system ensures stable governments without their policy being influenced and by extension the governing of the country by collective majorities which, due to the set-up of political life, is almost impossible,

As political observers note, it does not appear that the views of the two top men of our political life differ. Independent of what Mr Papandreou had maintained before the elections he now shares the feeling that the electoral system must produce stable governments. With these facts in mind but also on the basis of the fact that any modification of the electoral law must be brought about with the agreement or forbearance of the major opposition party, it is almost certain that there is no issue for the creation of a sharp political fight with the establishment of two rounds of elections. And the more probable is that any modification will be limited to the reduction of the percentage margin for the participation of parties in the second apportionment.

The May "Milestone"

Political observers maintain that an equally critical issue for Mr Papandreou is the presidential election about which, nevertheless, Mr Karamanlis has no reason to talk at this time nor disclose prematurely his possible intentions or even if they have been definitely formed.

It is considered very likely that in an attempted sounding out of the president by Mr Papandreou, Mr Karamanlis will object by saying that he has not yet come to a definite decision which, of course, will be a consequence of certain political developments. This point, in conjunction with the fact that Mr Papandreou is the "pusher" --three times he himself, through the voice of the government spokesman, has maintained that he would support Mr Karamanlis if he were to be a candidate for another 5-year term -- contributes to having the president be the one who holds every initiative for making a move, especially because of the relationship between the timing of the presidential election in May 1985 and that of the forthcoming parliamentary election.

In fact, the painful development of domestic issues for PASOK, as seen in the recent Euro-election results, have made Mr Papandreou very sensitive —contributing to this is pressure being put on him by some of his cadres— to any possible premature holding of elections. This is so because the passage of time only increases damage to the government instead of providing opportunities for an improvement of the situation which would offset this damage. However, the issue of elections, as Mr Papandreou himself has admitted, is among those prerogatives granted the chief of state by the constitution.

On the other hand, it is considered very doubtful if the present Chamber of Deputies can elect anyone other than Mr Karamanlis president. This is so because the PASOK-KKE majority just about surpasses the three-fifths margin needed for the election of the chief of state. In fact, of the 181 deputies that these two parties have, at least 10 PASOK deputies are considered to be cut from the list of candidates and their party discipline is questionable.

Under such conditions, Mr Papandreou would never dare try proposing another candidate having joint PASOK-KKE trust, given the fact that any possible failure in the election would lead to a dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the holding of elections with the basic question being who the new president of the republic would be.

Certainly, this critical meeting between Mr Papandreou and the president as well as everything that will transpire from the talks will also constitute his "indicators" to move forward toward the settlement of pending intra-party problems.

As government circles contend, the convening on the very same day, i.e. next Thursday, of the ministerial council, KYSYM /Government Council/ and in the afternoon of the executive office under the chairmanship of Mr Papandreou, is of determining importance both for intra-party developments and for a further effort by the government to show some invigorated face or some more realistic policy that would help in blunting the impression that the government is not functioning well.

Karamanlis Non-Committal

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 18 Jul 84 p 1

/Excerpts/ After the meeting between President Karamanlis and Prime Mininster Papandreou yeaterday that lasted several hours, the possibility for the holding of parliamentary elections in 1984 greatly increased. This conclusion was reached by important political elements who insist that a prime subject of yesterday's discussion between the two leaders was the timing of the parliamentary elections in conjunction with the holding of the presidential election next May. Nevertheless, it is considered almost certain that the talks were of an indirect sounding out nature, with the prime minister insisting on the need for Mr Karamanlis to renew his presidential mandate and on the need for the latter to avoid any binding answer with respect to his intentions.

Mr Papandreou's Dilemma

With Mr Karamanlis' refusal to provide any indication whatsoever of his intentions, Mr Papandreou is facing a dilemma of risking the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies at an inopportune time and under unfavorable political conditions. This will occur in case the current president feels that prospects are not conducive to his being given another mandate and the present Chamber of Deputies fails in electing another individual in his place.

In view of such a possibility the prevailing opinion within PASOK tends toward a hastening of elections with the selection of the most suitable time ——for the governing party—— that ranges from October to December 1984. In other words, during a period in which (a) the repercussions from the serious aggravation of the economic situation will not have yet appeared; (b) ND would not have yet reorganized for a new electoral battle and its leadership issue would remain in abeyance; (c) the linking of the elections with the presidential election in May would not be easy or direct and Mr Karamanlis' withdrawal or intent to remain in office would not directly influence the electorate; (d) the inevitable damage being suffered by PASOK would not have increased, damage whose proportions——in the space of 3 years—— were reflected in the recent Euro—elections; and (e) the hastening of elections would contain or ——even—— put an end to the imminent PASOK intra—party crisis.

Yesterday's Meeting

Yesterday's meeting between President Karamanlis and Prime Minister Papandreou at the Astera Hotel in Vouliagmeni began at 12:30 pm and continued with a luncheon. The meeting lasted about 2-1/2 hours.

Despite his endeavor to appear consistent with fixed practice —according to which the announcements by the Presidency of the Republic that mention meetings of the president of the republic and the prime minister are those that inform the public on issues discussed— Mr Papandreou, in his talk with political editors, before and after his meeting with Mr Karamanlis, could not but leave some indications about what the two top politicians were concerned.

Mr Papandreou specifically let it be understood that the basic item of the meeting was the timing of the elections. He at first excluded the fact that a subject of discussion was the procurement of military aircraft. He stated, "That is not a subject of discussion. The president might be interested in it but that is not a subject we will discuss. A subject could be on elections but not aircraft."

After the hours-long discussion he had with the president, Mr Papandreou in another talk with political editors stated that he has many times maintained to all parties concerned that the elections will take place at the end of the 4-year term of office. At the same time, however, in answer to a question if this position could be changed, Mr Papandreou contended that although he does insist on this particular position he does not exclude the possibility of elections "if something more important were to come up." Nevertheless, wanting to anticipate any conclusions from that statement he added, "But I do not see any reason why we should not leave the constitutional time limit prevail."

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CSO: 3521/305

POLITICAL

CDA STRATEGY, LUBBERS' ROLE IN 1986 ELECTION

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 7 Jul 84 pp 36-37

[Report by Frank Lafort: "Lubbers, From Politician to Statesman"]

[Text] In 1977, under the leadership of outgoing Prime Minister Den Uyl, the social democrats used the slogan: "Elect the Prime Minister." The three confessional parties which later were to turn into the current CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal], were incensed over that. In the view of the christian democrats such a PvdA [Labor Party] slogan was unconscionable. To illustrate the break with the past, the christian democrats will start campaigning at the beginning of 1986 or earlier with Prime Minister Lubbers as the CDA primary candidate—and indeed under the proven and successful slogan: "Elect the Prime Minister." Lubbers himself wouldn't mind being the lead dog of the CDA, according to a comment he had printed in CDA—ACTUEEL last week.

This "spontaneous" revelation by Lubbers in his party paper is the conclusion of a cleverly thought out strategy which in the past few months has been aimed at getting the CDA's own following used to the idea that in 1986 the current cabinet policy, which is so much influenced by Lubbers, would partly form the basic issue of new elections. CDA Party Chairman Bukman, who constantly hammers on the unity and clarity of the CDA, said already in December 1983 that the CDA would make the Lubbers-Van Aardenne cabinet the basic issue of new elections: "Certainly the undecided voters will not vote entirely independently of their view on the policy being pursued. If your party had a role in that policy, you should admit that and not say: it is bad; let's put it aside and forget about it."

That message has been continuously repeated since that time by the deftlyoperating Bukman. The old dogma of KVP [Catholic People's Party] Romme not
to commit oneself to one certain government partner has been permanently
abandoned by the CDA executive. With a self-assured Lubbers at the head
of this government coalition, the CDA leadership under the determined Bukman
is not afraid to state its opinion. Not only will this cabinet be made the
basic issue of new elections; Lubbers and Bukman cry out in chorus that
if there is sufficient electoral support in 1986, the coalition with the
liberals can be continued. That collaboration is not only an established
fact, according to Lubbers, "but also appropriate in the political climate."

Furthermore, by pushing Lubbers forward as future primary candidate of the CDA already at this stage, coalition partner VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] and its primary candidate, Nijpels, are being robbed of one of the most important trump cards. In matters of material well-being, the VVD is no longer able to use the CDA as a springboard in the coming election struggle, as it did in 1981 and 1982, which caused the CDA to see a large part of its electorate go to the liberals in the past years. Those same liberals have already proclaimed loudly that they, also, want to make the cabinet policy the basic issue of new elections and that they want to continue the collaboration with the CDA after 1986.

The VVD thus seems to be tied to the apron strings of Lubbers, who has now been especially appointed to call a halt to the deterioration process of his party in the liberal direction. The European Parliament election results, which were relatively favorable for the CDA, have strengthened Bukman in that striving; after all, the CDA regained 26,000 VVD voters of 1982. The same European Parliament result should force the liberals, after the summer recess, to give thought to the strategy to be pursued. VVD parliamentary group chairman Nijpels correctly points out that younger voters especially, from whom the VVD usually obtains high scores, failed to show interest in this election.

Is that writing on the wall? Liberal member of the Chamber Professor Dr J.J.C. Voorhoeve anticipated this development already in mid-1983 in the magazine CIVIS MUNDI. He commented: "The limited political-philosophical basis might possibly offer too little inspiration and idealism to tie new voters to the VVD for a longer period. A part of the younger following is politically sensitive; that sensitivity acts to the advantage of the VVD in the early eighties because the political culture in our country is moving somewhat to the right and a new generation is always first in doing so. An increased individualism also acts to the advantage of the VVD. These trends could reverse over a longer period (1986? F.L.). When, in a strongly automated society, the lone individual once again feels a great need for the snugness of a small-scale collective bond, and when the need for inspiration increases due to orthodox-religious or ideological values, the freethinkingliberal approach might lose political following. The spiritual insecurity of the unemployed, single consumer in a strongly changing, highly technological society makes him crave security and identification with something great."

What Voorhoeve warned against is now already being manipulated by party politician Lubbers. The christian democrat subtly points out—speculating on family conservatism—in CDA/ACTUEEL of last week that "the CDA view on society clearly shows up in the policy for the so-called intermediate structure, that is to say: the area between the government and the individual. Just look at the two-income law, broadcasting companies, and at the individual responsibility of the social partners. Those are points which don't go directly against the VVD view, but they clearly are somewhat different."

A further complicating factor for the VVD is that the CDA has quietly usurped a great number of liberal hobbyhorses, such as decreasing the

financing deficit and revising the social security system, and shortly it will have those points defended by party politician Lubbers. There was a reason that VVD Campaign Manager Boosman last week announced in "VRIJHEID EN DEMOCRATIE," the mouthpiece of the VVD: "A hard task is awaiting the VVD until the chamber elections in 1986. /It will take hard work to win back the lost ground./ If that happens and if the socioeconomic recovery continues and the party is able to carry it through well, there is a good prospect for the coming years."

However, it is painful for the liberals that the commission of economic experts of the Socioeconomic Council indicates "a not unimportant" delay in the economic growth of the Netherlands for 1986 and 1987. That setback also rebounds to /party politician/ Lubbers. The christian democrats however, in contrast to the liberals, have developed an escape route: in 1986 they will not introduce Lubbers as a party politician but as /statesman/ Lubbers.

Lubbers is aware of what his predecessors did not realize, or hardly realized --perhaps with the exception of Prime Minister Den Uyl: speaking constitutionally, the prime minister has his own maneuvering space, and his actions are no longer limited to playing chairman of the ministers' council. Lubbers makes the best possible use of his current post. Like few others before him, he knows how to make an optimum use of the apparatus of General Affairs. Through his chairmanship of the various sub-councils and special commissions of the ministers' council he has acquired an iron grip on the decision-making process. Prime Minister Lubbers not only is the coordinator of the government policy which watches the coherence of the government policy, but increasingly this prime minister reveals himself internally and externally as the arbitrator: he settles disputes between ministers or between ministers and others. If a collision is threatening between one of his ministers and the Second Chamber, the members of the chamber belonging to the government groups are summoned, more often than ever before, to the renowned little tower of General Affairs where Lubbers personally tries to iron out the difficulties.

If this "pragmatic dualism" should fail at times, Prime Minister Lubbers abandons motions without effort and without punishment. That happened just last week, amongst others with the VVD- and CDA motions, supported by the PvdA, about the sub-titling of TV programs introduced by cable, micro-wave or satellite. And what should one think of the "nation-wide" acting of Prime Minister Lubbers, recorded by TV cameras, in the recent debate on the cruise missiles? Ministers De Ruiter [Defense] and Van den Broek [Foreign Affairs] were silent sphinxes for two whole days while Lubbers spoke. He alone answered the questions. He alone defended his compromise.

This solitary acting is in sharp contrast to that of his predecessor Van Agt with respect to the NATO dual decision of 1979. Both the then minister of foreign affairs, Van der Klaauw, and former Minister of Defense Scholten actively participated in the debates in the Second Chamber in 1979. Parliament, consciously or unconsciously, has strengthened the halo of the practically "untouchable" Prime Minister Lubbers during the past 2 years—by calling

Lubbers on the carpet as prime minister with increasing frequency. If, for example, Minister Brinkman (Welfare and Health) makes a slip of the tongue in an interview with VRIJ NEDERLAND, Lubbers has to put in an appearance in the Second Chamber to explain the matter. When Lubbers goes to the United States for an unofficial visit and some speeches, he personally has to give a detailed personal accounting to the permanent commission for foreign affairs, etc. Partly against this background, Leiden constitutional expert Dr Van Raalte warned already in 1954 that not only the person of the prime minister, but also his character, skills and authorities are of great significance to his /real/ position.

Prime Minister Lubbers wants to excell in the political handiwork and, amongst other things, the new developments in constitutional law enable him to do so. However, it clashes with the spirit of a coalition cabinet, which depends on various parliamentary groups in the Second Chamber and which therefore does not allow a strong prime minister. Where their mutual sympathies lie is clear from the language used by the two government parties. The christian democrats speak delicately about the Lubbers Cabinet, while the liberals always talk of the Lubbers/Van Aardenne Cabinet.

If one should want to curb the dominating position of the prime minister a little, an agreement could be made after the 1986 elections to let the so-called presidium (prime minister and one or more vice prime ministers) have a greater political authority. This suggestion was made by the Nijmegen constitutional law expert Mr Th. C. de Graaf in the July issue, still to be published, of the TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR OPENBAAR BESTUUR [Magazine for Public Administration]. De Graaf: "Already now this presidium, composed of the leaders of the coalition parties, forms the political "leadership" of the cabinet. Unanimity on the most important government principles within the presidium could be followed by broad 'indications' to the other ministers. If opposition is voiced, the council of ministers could still debate and then decide." Through this intervention the prime minister, as of old, becomes "primus inter pares": first among equals.

8700 CSO 3614/105 CENTER PARTY IN QUANDRY OVER CABINET ROLE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norweigan 27 Jul 84 p 7

[Text] Stay On, JJJ!

Party Chairman Johan J. Jakobsen, stay on in the job you have, stay in the government. This is the unanimous view of the Center Party's regional chairmen. A survey conducted by the A-press indicates, however, that the regional chairmen are demanding that the Center Party take stronger stands, both within the government and in Parliament.

"We obviously have a problem in defining positions. In particular the Party must be better at informing the public, we must get out on the road again. It now seems that there are only two parties in the country here—the Conservative Party and the Labor Party. This must not go on," says the Center Party's regional chairman in Vestfold, Nils Filip Agerup.

The chairman of the Akershus branch of the Center Party, Asbjorn Eggum, says that the recent discussion on the participation of the Party chairman in the government is not causing any damage to the Party. "It is a healthy sign that the question is even being raised, and therefore the Party must be willing to discuss the matter. In addition, it seems to me that Jakobsen is doing a good job both as Party chairman and as cabinet minister. The recent Gallup defeat for the Party has, I think, been turned around. The loss of unity is only temporary," says Eggum.

"The Center Party's apparatus must be more active, and I think in particular that the Party's deputy chairperson, Anne Enger Lahnstein, should be given the best possible working conditions so that she will be able to promote the assumption of the clearer Party positions which Jakobsen is not able to provide. To demand, however, that Jakobsen should leave the government is, in my view, wrong. He is doing best being where he is," says the chairman of the Center Party in Oppland, Einar Moe.

Within the Telemark Center Party, the chairman, Svein Sem, has not called for Jakobsen to resign from the government. "It is totally unreasonable to expect a person to perform two jobs to everyone's satisfaction. On the other hand, a party cannot stand or fall with the fortunes of a single man. It would, however, be entirely natural for the Party to discuss for the future what

position we should take towards having the same man be both chairman and cabinet minister. In any case we must enhance our impact on the issues. If we do not manage to make an acceptable mark on the upcoming state budget as regards district politics, public health and local and regional economics, then we have no business being in a government with the other existing parties. The announced regional statement may also be a good opportunity for the Party to make its mark," says Sem.

The demand that Jakobsen leave the government is being made by group leaders in the party district organizations of Rogaland, More and Romsdal. They feel that Jakobsen must leave the government so that he can concentrate on the job of chairman.

CSO: 3639/146

NEXT STORTING ELECTION TO BRING GENERATIONAL CHANGE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 23 Jun 84 p 7

[Article by Alf Ole Ask: "Generational Change in Parliament"]

[Text] Nominations for the 1985 parliamentary election has just begun. A generational change is in process. The postwar generation is about to take over Parliament. About 40 parliamentary representatives have already said they do not wish to run for another 4 years and a large number of representatives are spending the summer contemplating whether to run again or not.

The Labor Party is probably the least into the nominating process. District party nominations will not be held until late winter 1985. Nevertheless, it is clear that a large number of party politicians have decided not to run for another term in Parliament, while many others are yet undecided. Aksel Fossen, Eivind Bolle, Liv Andersen, Osmund Faremo, Kristine Rusten, Alf Bjorno, Engly Lie, Karl Ingebrigtsen, Guttorm Hansen, Odvar Nordli and Arne Nilsen have decided not to run for another term in Parliament. Kristine Rusten, Oppland, 44 years old, is the youngest representative to decline another term.

Veteran Conservatives

Two veteran Conservatives are leaving Parliament, namely parliamentary President Per Hysing-Dahl and Minister of Foreign Affairs Svenn Stray.

Thor Listau, presently Minister of Fisheries, does not want to serve another terms in Parliament either. Oslo Conservative Party Chairman Per Ditlev-Simonsen has declined another term and so have Torstein Tynning, Claus Feyling, Hakon Randal and Oddbjorn Langlo. In North Trondelag, former Minister of Environmental Affairs Wenche Frogn Sellag could replace Gunnar Vada, who is at the top of today's voting list. The majority of the Nominating Committee would like this.

Massacre in KRF

There is actually a massacre of Christian People's Party (KRF) candidates. Present Minister of Trade and Commerce Asbjorn Haugstvedt has already decided

not to run for another term and so has Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Jakob Aano. The only woman in the group, Aslaug Fredriksen, is also leaving. There will be accompanied by Knut Haus, Odd With, Hans Olav Tungesvik, Johannes Vagsnes, Jorgen Sonstebo, Jens P. Fla and Per Husabo. Altogether 10 of KRF's 15 parliamentary representatives will now be leaving.

SP and Hordaland

Seven of 15 parliamentary representatives from Hordaland are withdrawing, one of them being Sverre Helland, Center Party (SP). Among other SP candidates from various districts who now wish to be replaced are Arnold Weiberg Aurdal, Johannes Syrstad and Ambjorg Salthun.

From among the smaller parties, there are also several who want to withdraw; Stein Ornhoi and Arent M. Henriksen, Socialist Left Part (SV) and half of the Liberal Party representatives are withdrawing because their parliamentary leader Hammond Rossback has declined renomination. All of the four Progressive Party (FRP) representatives will be running again.

Most of those who do not wish to run again have served three or more terms in Parliament. Some 40 have already decided not to run again and another 20 are still undecided. If none of those who want to continue are voted out, or the election results drastically change the composition of Parliament, approximately 100 of those who now serve will remain in Parliament another 4 years beginning in 1985.

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CONSERVATIVE CHAIRMAN WARNS MIDDLE PARTIES ON LIST ALLIANCE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 26 Jun 84 p 7

[Article by Roger Bergersen: "KRF and SP Should Be Wary"]

[Text] The Conservative Party coolly approves of an electoral pact with its government partners, but the party leadership warns that an electoral pact in some districts is clearly a violation against one of the government parties.

Conservative Party Chairman Jo Benkow has not yet established absolute conditions for such a pact, but maintains that the middle parties are morally obligated to be wary.

"Parties do not have the authority to instruct districts directly, but these are morally obligated to consider the Conservative Party in an area where we have consideration for them," said Benkow, who pointed out that the Conservative Party endorses an electoral pack because the middle parties very much want it.

The central leadership of the Conservative Party agreed to tentative plans for an electoral pact last Monday—as a kind of second—rate solution. The party is principally against such a pact, but claims there is no way around it as long as the Labor Party opposes "just" changes in the election law.

"If an electoral pact between the government parties would make the Labor Party change its position, we would stand to gain much," said Benkow.

He said that if the Conservative Party were to do poorly in connection with an electoral pact while the three government parties together were to gain from it, it would benefit "both the Conservative Party and the country."

It is expected that the general secretaries of the three parties will sit down and lay the groundwork for such an electoral pact. When this will happen is not yet known, but there seems to be no hurry about it for the time being.

8952 CSO: 3639/133 POLITICAL

POLL MEASURES VOTER CONFIDENCE IN WILLOCH GOVERNMENT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 27 Jun 84 p 6

[Article by Tone B. Jamholt: "Government Loses Confidence"]

[Text] Kare Willoch's government is losing voter confidence. In May this year, 44 percent of the voters had much or fairly much confidence in the government, while 52 percent had little or very little confidence. In August 1983, the figures were 49 and 46 percent respectively. This is according to a poll taken by the Norwegian Polling Institute for ARBEIDERBLADET.

The coalition government will probably minimize the 5 percent decline in confidence and say it is not dramatic. Government parties usually experience a decline in voter confidence as they gradually develop symptoms of wear and tear.

Decline in Oslo

Nevertheless, the trend is interesting. Confidence is declining the most in Conservative bastions like Oslo and Akershus. The number of voters with much confidence in the government has declined from 27 to 18 percent in this area. Some 16 percent have little confidence, compared to only 5 percent in the last poll.

This can only be interpreted as a sharp "kick in the shinbone" for the Conservative Party. When the stronghold in and around Oslo is weakening, there might be ripple effects throughout the country.

There is little indication that dissatisfied Conservatives are flocking to the Progressive Party (FRP). The far right maintains its position within the party, but is not experiencing "the dream growth" predicted by Carl I. Hagen in broad daylight during the party congress last spring. FRP is just as satisfied/dissatisfied with the government now as it was about a year ago. The same is true of Conservative and Center Party voters. The Willoch government's reputation has declined sharply among Labor Party, Socialist Left Party (SV) and Liberal Party voters. But the Christian People's Party (KRF) is giving record support to Willoch. Altogether, 69 percent of the KRF voters have much confidence in Willoch, while 22 percent has little confidence. About a year ago, the figures were 58 percent and 40 percent.

The polling question asked was: "Do you have very much, fairly much, fairly little or very little confidence in the Willoch government?" This was the distribution of answers: 13 percent (15 in the last poll) very much, 31 percent (34) fairly much, 29 percent (30) fairly little and 23 percent (16) very little. Some 5 percent did not know.

Account

Today Kare Willoch submits his political account of the first 6 months of this year. He is indisputably still the government leader and appoints cabinet ministers if necessary. There was much confusion in Parliament while Willoch was on sick leave.

Nevertheless, there are speculations about when Willoch will resign. He has already designated a crown prince in Arne Skauge, who is now being schooled in the prime minister's office. It may be an impossible challenge for the two of them to reverse a negative trend when the coalition parties' need to position themselves in growing from week to week. Kare Kristiansen will hardly be the only person to be reprimanded publicly by the prime minister.

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POLITICAL

CHRISTIAN PARTY LEADER DISCOUNTS POSSIBILITY OF ELECTION ALLIANCE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 19 Jun 84 p 7

[Text] "It is not likely that the Christian People's Party (KRF) will enter into an electoral pact with the Conservative Party, nor with the Liberal Party, in connection with the parliamentary election next year," KRF parliamentary leader Harald Synnes told ARBEIDERBLADET.

Synnes made this remark in a commentary on the resolution passed by the Christian People's Party Youth (KRFU) Congress last weekend, in which the youth organization rejected an electoral pact with the Conservative Party. However, KRFU was open to such a pact with the Liberal Party.

Synnes pointed out that party estimates in various districts show that KRF does not stand to gain from an electoral pact with the Conservative Party. As far as the Liberal Party is concerned, the KRF parliamentary leader feels that political circumstances make such a pact difficult.

"As a government party it would seem strange for us to help the opposition strengthen its position. Furthermore, the Liberal Party has said it is not interested in an electoral pact," said Synnes.

Synnes is of the opinion that, among the government parties, KRF and the Center Party (SP) is most likely to take advantage of an electoral pact. It is too early to say how many districts would be involved in such a pact. Synnes added that this is a matter for individual districts to decide.

8952 CSO: 3639/133 POLITICAL

ROCA ON ALTERNATIVE TO SOCIALISTS

Madrid YA in Spanish 22 Jul 84 p 9

[Interview with Miguel Roca by Enrique Beotas in Madrid; date not given]

[Text] Miguel Roca does not vacillate; and when it comes time for him to appraise the situation he takes a close look at the questions and shapes his answers with the same unassuming manner that he displays on the floor of parliament.

[Question] This is a time for political stock-taking and for reflection. Especially for someone who is preparing his political offensive for when he returns from vacation...

[Answer] Stock-taking always depends on the parameters within which it is done. Of all the different ways to evaluate the results of a political action, the climate of confidence which it has generated is the most fundamental factor. On this point everyone agrees that the actions of the government not only have failed to increase confidence, but instead have acted to appreciably decrease the confidence of the citizens about the nation's future possibilities. Confidence in investment has not been created, and therefore jobs are not being generated; they have stirred up confusion in the operation of the government; they have not accurately defined the essence of Spain's negotiating position with the European Economic Community; or they have spread anxiety among all the citizens, telling them that their pensions are not going to be paid.

[Question] Let us talk about the crisis which never happened. Does Miguel Roca believe that it is advisable for it to take place?

[Answer] I do not know if it was necessary or not, but now it is beginning to be essential, because otherwise the government will continue trapped in a transition to an aborted crisis. From the moment when rumors were allowed to spread to such an extent that ministers are making their own speculations, it appeared necessary. In any case, I believe that Mitterrand gave us a lesson on how these matters ought to be resolved: that is, by taking action before the rumors spread.

Banca Catalana

[Question] The story of the Banca Catalana is only too well known. What do you think of the way the government acted throughout this case?

[Answer] Since the day when the accusation was made, I have not wanted to make any kind of statement on this subject which could be taken as clear interference in the judicial process. For the first time it seemed to me that a leak has had a positive effect in finding the real dimensions of what this subject involves. It is difficult to defend an act of such far reaching implications which is justified by an accusation containing the features this one has. For our part, we have complete confidence in the courts, which alone must decide, and we are calm and emotionally moved, because despite the attempt to damage President Pujol which al involved, he has come to be regarded as an object of consideration, respect and solidarity by all of Spain. If anyone was trying to tear down the image of Pujol with this accusation they made a mistake.

[Question] Mr Fraga stated he had heard that Miguel Roca, with the reformist operation, had set his sights on going over to the Popular Alliance.

[Answer] Miguel Roca has set his sights on creating an alternative which is capable of replacing the socialist government by another. That is—how the citizens and society can be offered a message of liberty, progress and modernity which would be compatible with efficiency. I have always said, and I am going to say it again, that Fraga himself and the Popular coalition which he represents render a great service to Spain to the extent that he finally is putting together an option for the conservative Right. We occupy different positions in politics, and naturally, we are going to meet each other in the political game. But that does not mean that Fraga and the Popular Alliance are part of my plans.

[Question] How far to the Left and how far to the Right do the boundaries of that reformist party extend?

[Answer] On the Right they are very closely identified with the Popular Alliance. On the Left, up to where socialist policies in their strict sense begin. That is, if the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] carries out a centrist and moderate policy, then the people vote for us, as we have been occupying the space for a longer time and thus with a greater degree of authority. This would oblige the socialists to occupy their own space, and not disappoint a large portion of the electorate.

[Question] What did they think of Miguel Roca in Betanzos?

[Answer] I went to Betanzos and filled a movie theater. I am travelling all through Spain, from Palencia to Almeria, passing through the Canaries and Lugo, and I have not encountered any kind of problem, possibly because the people who come are interested in the operation. In any case, all the polls are now showing that the leaders of the Right and of the PSOE are going down in popularity, and that those of us who want to represent this section are gaining. Spain has always been a country of the Center,

which voted for the Center in 1977, in 1979; and in 1982 a maneuver by the PSOE first destroyed the Center, and then took it over. Now with this party we are going to restore what used to be the democratic traditions of Spanish centrism.

[Question] Could you be a bit more specific and define that line of demarcation between the socialists who do not have a place in the reformist operation and those who do?

[Answer] What we have to do is to determine whether what is going to be put first in action by the government are the interests of a party or the wider interests of Spain. Secondly, whether what we are trying to do is to increase state control of the economy, or trying to slow down economic dynamism in the sector open to the initiative of the privately-owned industrial sector. Whether freedom is understood as a continuing service granted to the citizens by the tutelage of the state, or whether it is the recognition of the right of citizens to be able to exercise this freedom, and the agreement by the public authorities to make it possible. This is where the boundary line lies.

The State

[Question] How has the government's policy affected Catalonia?

[Answer] In the same way that it has any other community. It could be that the total disarray of its autonomy policy is more apparent, especially because of its incongruity in financing the autonomous communities. There is suspicion because of what was a mistake in autonomous policy on the part of the government. There has been a great deal of concern about economics, about the impact of a reconversion which was never well developed and never well explained, and above all about the increase in tax pressure as a formula for financing the budget deficit. If we add to this a whole series of "extras" in the field of public liberties, or the maintenance of a style of superior force and sectarianism which often dominates the behavior of the government, then we must say that the government's actions are not viewed with enthusiasm in Catalonia.

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CSO: 3548/300

MILITARY

ELECTRONICS FIRM TO BUILD RADAR IMPROVING AIR BASE DEFENSES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Jul 84 Sect III p 1

[Article by Jens Trudso: "Terma Lands Contracts Amounting to Half a Billion Kroner"]

[Text] The electronics firm Terma, with headquarters in Lystrup, near Aarhus, whose specialties include radar systems, has landed a contract for refurbishing the Air Force's short-range defense systems, at a cost of 100 million kroner.

The contracts are practically rolling in at the offices of the Danish electronics firm Terma Electronics, Inc, located in Lystrup, near Aarhus. Terma, as almost the only Danish bidder, has just been selected over the other bidders in an international contest for modernizing the Danish Air Force's short-range defense system. The contract amounts to some 100 million kroner.

"Counting the contracts we already have in-house, we now have contracts for the next five-year period amounting to some 500 million kroner," Terma's administrative director Johannes Jacobsen told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

He expects that this contract, involving the renovation of the Danish short-range air defense system by means of new radar systems, as well as a modernization of the electronic controlling systems at our military air bases, will open the door to new export contracts.

Terma, which today has 300 employees, already has some solid contracts on the books from the Danish military. Some of them include a job for several hundred million kroner, involving the furnishing of new VHF radios to the Army and the domestic defense system: a job for 35 million kroner, involving new GCA equipment for Danish military air bases; and electronics and radar systems for landing equipment, to be made at the company's plant in Lystrup.

Director Johannes Jacobsen informed us that this last contract from the Air Force Materiel Command in Vaerlose will insure work for fifty employees for four years, from 1984 to 1988.

This is in addition to engineers and technical employees, who will also be involved on this project, which is anticipated as a stepping-stone to new export contracts.

It is expected that the firm, in addition to a total renovation of the existing systems, will be able to achieve such a satisfactory modernization that the systems will remain up to date for a number of years.

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DEFENSE MINISTER TO NAME OFFICERS TO NEW MILITARY ANALYSIS GROUP

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 3 Jul 84 pp 4-5

[Article by Erik Matzen: "Slap in the Face for High-Ranking Officers--Analysis Group to Evaluate Armed Forces"]

[Text] The battle has already begun as to who will sit on the analysis committee which will be evaluating our entire military program. The outcome of the battle will determine the blueprint for military development all the way up to the year 2000. The establishment of this new group is at the same time a slap in the face for our top military officers, an indication that government officials are not willing to leave Denmark's armed forces in the hands of generals and admirals. They are too important and costly for that. The government officials, to put it more plainly, have suspected the high-ranking military officers of putting their own careers above real military interests, since their high ranks depend upon the number of fighter planes, fighting ships and tanks.

According to the recently approved defense agreement, Defense Minister Hans Engell will appoint the chairman for the new, independent consulting and analysis group, which will be directly responsible to the defense minister. The chairman will then in turn appoint the group's additional six members—three military officers and three civilian specialists.

Had the Top Officers on His Back

There will be special efforts to appoint Major Jens Jorn Graabaek, of the Defense Intelligence Service, to the group, since it was he who first began the ongoing debate on the future of the military. He had the Navy's top officers on his back when he suggested eliminating some of our submarines and frigates.

It is equally clear that the Navy will do all it can to keep Graabaek out of the group. The Navy has already made various attempts to curtail—and thereby control—Graabaek's activities. This is why the head of the Intelligence Service, Commander Mogens Telling, offered to arbitrate in negotiations between Vice-Admiral S. Thiede of the Defense Chiefs of Staff and Graabaek, if the latter would be willing to submit to Thiede's conditions. Graabaek refused.

Attemps Made to "Label" Graabaek

Following this, the Navy has attempted to label Graabaek as psychologically deviant, a matter which will probably end in having the Folketing forbid high-ranking officers to evaluate the health of their personnel.

Hans Engell commented: "It is a widespread wish among our government officials that our military future be evaluated. We do not have enough money to make misguided investments. New materiel for the Army's Airborne Divison costs one billion kroner, and every new submarine costs at least half a billion kroner, and we don't want to find out after the fact that we used the money in the wrong place. Our goal is to have each tax krone achieve maximum effect. And so we will be asking the group as soon as possible to evaluate a number of proposed projects," he added.

One possibility for the chairman of the analysis group is the head of the Military Research Service, Vilhelm Guntelberg. He has previously approved Graabaek, and criticized the Defense High Command for shortsightedness, after they cut back on grants for military research. His comments were as follows: "Our opportunities to keep abreast of current technological developments in weaponry have been reduced. We have to think of how our military strength in 1886 [sic] will measure up in the year 2000. It is the prevailing opinion over there (in the Defense High Command--ed.) that technological expertise is of secondary importance."

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WOMEN NOW GIVEN POSITIONS IN COMBAT LINE AREA

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 27 Jun 84 p 15

[Article by Erik Matzen]

[Text] Women will now be permitted to drive Army tanks, to fire artillery equipment, and even to come under fire with other infantry troops, right in the front lines. In November, a squad of women privates will be beginning their training in the Air Force's artillery units, and in February the Army will begin training women in a number of regiments in Jutland and Zealand. Altogether, the armed forces estimate that this first stage will involve 75 women between the ages of 18 and 26, who will be receiving a salary of approximately 10,000 kroner a month.

The armed forces have up to now refused to put women in the front combat line area, for two principal reasons. In the first place, there has been skepticism as to whether women can tolerate the same conditions as men while waging the noble art of war. In the second place, there has been concern about morale problems throughout the armed forces which might result if women were involved.

But the equal rights law has forced the hand of the military. Four years ago, in an attempt to accommodate this law, the military proposed involving women in testing programs on Navy ships, Army tanks and Air Force missiles, but this proposal has only borne fruit in the Navy--with excellent results, by the way. Nothing has come of it in the two other branches of the armed forces, which has been seen as an unequivocal violation by the Equal Rights Board.

The dispensation for this first proposal runs out at the end of this year, and the armed forces will not be granted another one unless concrete plans can be produced for the other two branches.

And so the military has finally acted—in the eleventh hour. Colonel J. Lautrup—Nisse, of the Defense High Command, has indicated that polls were conducted among the male privates prior to the introduction of the new program, researching their attitudes about working with women. They were afraid, according to these surveys, that women would take over all the good jobs, leaving them with the tough ones.

"This would benefit neither the armed forces nor the women themselves," Lautrup-Nissen said. "If we involve women in testing programs, it will be under the same conditions as the men. Otherwise it will be worthless. It may well be true that the women will have a hard time carrying the 45-kilo projectiles up to their artillery pieces, but we see a lot of men who can't do it either. It isn't any fun sitting all cramped up inside a tank, but that's how things are. We'll be seeing soon how things will work out," he concluded.

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D'Harcourt On National Defense

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 16 Jul 84 p 42

[Article by Florence D'Harcourt, CNIP [National Center of Independents and Peasants] deputy from Hauts-de-Seine]

[Text] While those of the political class prattle and flay one another and the authorities campaign on the basis of security considerations, the French people continue to be dangerously vulnerable in the event of a crisis. As a group, they are permanent victims of what we could call the Maginot Line syndrome: they want to feel protected and yet refuse to even envisage the thought that the protection they have could be destroyed or circumvented.

We have forged a good sword with our well-trained army and our strike force; the shield remains to be cast. In fact, this is nothing more than overall defense, assured, of course, by military means but also by civilian means. Civil defense falls within the framework of the Ordinance of 7 January 1959 on the general organization of defense; however, for financial and, paradoxically, doctrinal reasons, it has never seen the light of day. Nevertheless, civil defense in times of crisis is the extension of the civil protection already implemented by the Minister of Interior.

The official texts assign him five responsibilities in this order:

- -- to provide for the security of public authorities;
- --to assure public order;
- -- to protect activities which are essential for the life of the people (electric power plants, etc.);
- --to safeguard the people (shelters, etc.);
- -- "to assume responsibility for and to strengthen the people's will to resist the effects of attacks." The separate two managements of the region of the control of the contro

For almost 2 years, it seems that new interest in civil defense is being manifested in public opinion and the media. We can reasonably explain this by the technological progress in arms and the accelerated deterioration of the international context. The miniaturization of nuclear payloads and the increased accuracy of the vectors have given rise to the fear that nuclear weapons have lost their exclusive character as deterrent weapons and have

become theater weapons. The strongly felt need to protect ourselves from these weapons is reinforced by the efforts undertaken in the sector of protection of population centers in the United States and in particular more recently in the Soviet Union. The increase in armed confrontations, the widening of zones of tension and the scope attained by terrorism are not strangers to this realization. Therefore, it is a matter of urgency for the political authorities to refrain from posing the problem in partisan terms but in terms of the effectiveness and credibility of the entire nation's defense. Although the defense of a nation continues to be overall in nature, it appears that the threat is multifaceted and that we should not make any mistakes in our perception of the reality of this threat. Henceforth, no country, even one which possesses strike force, is safe from an attack in its sanctuary by a nuclear, conventional, biologic or chemical weapon. Added to these direct threats we have indirect threats which are all the more serious because they are insidious: are not subversion, terrorism, disinformation and pacifism the modern and daily forms of these perils?

Therefore, it is imperative for us to maintain our nuclear and conventional armies at their levels of credibility by implementing a civil defense as the guarantor of our strategy of deterrence. By affirming our will to assure the survival of the population we are showing our determination to respond to any kind of provocation.

Above all civil defense must be a combined effort involving every citizen aware of the fact that he cannot expect the state to do everything. A school for public-spiritedness, alongside other institutions such as national education and the armies, could play a formative role and be the reflection of the nation's morale. A resigned country is a country defeated in advance.

Hernu on Chemical Defense

Paris ARMEE NOUVELLE in French No 10, 2d Qtr 1984, p 12

[Text] Question asked by Mme D'Harcourt, deputy: Taking chemical warfare into account in the National Defense sector, what are the capabilities of our forces to survive and strike back in the event of a chemical attack?

Answer given by the Minister of Defense:

You know, madame, that France has always paid particular attention to the problem of chemical weapons. In fact, this attention attests to the importance of the threat they pose, particularly in Europe. In the face of the chemical threat, France has elected to defend itself: it proposes to assure the protection of its forces against all forms of chemical attacks, which requires complete information about their effects.

Defense against chemical weapons has been in preparation since the return of peace and calls for constant and suitable instruction and training.

For several years, government directives have given our armies a real appreciation of this problem.

All combat units are now equipped at the unit level with detection, protection and decontamination gear. These units train regularly on the use of this equipment, as defense against chemical weapons must be integrated with maneuvers. Every combatant must be given the means of detection and evaluation as well as the means of individual decontamination.

All this equipment is maintained and renewed on a permanent basis. The equipment is stored in the supply rooms of the basic units and is issued with the individual's gear of which it is now an integral part.

In a related matter, most combat vehicles are equipped to permit them to keep moving, in spite of enemy use of chemical weapons.

Finally, equipment programs for the armies have been developed covering warning networks and the means for marking off contaminated areas.

The chemical threat, therefore, is really taken into account by our army to protect and defend itself.

However, this action would be incomplete if it were not accompanied by a determined effort to reach a verifiable agreement banning the production of chemical weapons, including in particular a precise timetable for the destruction of stockpiles and the dismantling of specialized production installations.

That is the orientation of the action taken and the proposals presented by our country to the Geneva Disarmament Commission.

In this sector, France assumes particular responsibilities since it is the depository of the 1925 Geneva protocol which bans the use of chemical weapons.

What is more, France recently reiterated categorically and definitively that it is opposed to the use of these weapons.

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MILITARY

BRIEFS

AIR FORCE APPOINTMENTS--Gen Jose da Silva Cardoso was appointed yesterday the new operational commander of the Air Force. Gen Silva Cardoso is replacing Gen Francisco Dias da Costa Gomes, who recently became deputy chief of the Air Force General Staff. [Excerpt] [Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 2 Aug 84 p 3]

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MILITARY

ANKARA CONVEYS TURKISH INTEREST IN SPANISH ARMS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 22 Jul 84 p 21

[Article by S.N.]

[Text] Zeki Yavuzturk, Turkey's minister of national defense, will arrive late today in Madrid on a 4-day official visit. The Turkish minister, who has been invited by his Spanish counterpart, Narciso Serra, will negotiate the purchase of Spanish weapons. During his visit in Spain he will have several talks with his opposite number.

Similarly, Zeki Yavuzturk will meet the heads of the Spanish Armed Forces, will visit arms manufacturing plants, attend protocol functions, and make some tourist trips.

According to Spanish Ministry of Defense sources, the Turkish minister's official visit is connected with the meetings that minister Serra has recently had with his counterparts from countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance.

Turkey is not interested in purchasing transport aircraft and Spain is competing with Italy and Canada for Turkey's business under its program for acquiring 50 planes. The Spanish entry is its CN-235 aircraft built by the Aeronautical Manufacturing Enterprise.

The decision of the Turkish authorities to postpone by 3 months their final decision on the program for the modernization of the aircraft of the Turkish Air Force favors Spain, considering that it had entered the contest later than its competitors.

Specifically, tomorrow morning, before his official reception at the Buena-vista palace, the Turkish minister will attend a fly-by of the C-101 and the CN-235 in Getafe, the location where CASA [Harvester Suppliers, Inc.] has its plant. Furthermore, Turkey is interested in Spain's Teruel rocket-launchers, the multiple "meroka" system being produced by CETME [Center for Technical Studies of Special Materials], and the BMR [medium armored car] vehicles of ENASA [National Trucking Company]. These enterprises are also

included on the list of visits of the Turkish defense minister. According to the general captaincy of the Seventh Military Region, the visit that a Turkish Government delegation will make next Tuesday to Castille-Leon is of an exclusively commercial character. Turkey's minister of national defense, accompanied by various aides, will visit in Valladolid ENASA's plant in connection with Turkey's interest in purchasing military armored cars. Similarly, some members of the Turkish delegation will travel to Burgos to visit the facilities of EDBSA [possibly, Burgos Explosives Manufacturing, Inc.], an affiliate of the Spanish Explosives Union.

In Seville the Turkish minister of national defense will visit the facilities of the Santa Barbara national enterprise and will be briefed on the spot on the assembly-line operations of the AMX-30 main battle tanks.

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OIL, URANIUM SEEN AS COMPENSATING FOR DROP IN DANISH AID

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 12 Jul 84 p 3

[Article by Hannes Gamillscheg: "Raw Materials Deposits Under Eternal Ice. Greenland Cannot Dispense With the Billions From Denmark"]

[Text] NUUK. A fascinating picture is offered to the airplane passenger from Copenhagen to Greenland during the last hour of flight if he is lucky with the weather. Before the machine lands in Kangerlussuaq on the west coast of the island if flies over the inland ice: a white, glittering expanse, only occasionally broken by glacial peaks which tower as high as 3,000 meters. No road, no shrub, no house, no animals, only ice. Hundreds of kilometers wide.

No one knows what lies hidden under this ice. There are scientists who think that the world's largest oil basin lies under Greenland. There are others who call Greenland a paradise for ores and minerals. The greatest part of the perhaps immeasurable riches will probably always remain undiscovered. Indeed, where can one begin to search? Greenland is more than 2 million square kilometers large.

Since the coal mine of Qutdligssat was closed down 12 years ago, mining is now carried on in only one place: the Canadian Greenex Company extracts about 200,000 tons of lead and zinc annually from the "Black Angel" mine near Maarmorilik. It is also suspected that there are tungsten deposits in the relatively easily accessible mountains on the coast of Greenland.

Even an application to look for gold has been made to the "Raw Materials Administration"—a joint Greenland-Danish organ which regulates the exploitation of the mineral resources. However, Greenland is considered a "Land of Hope" above all for oil and uranium.

Eight years ago international oil companies searched for oil in the Davis Strait off the west coast. Two years later they broke off the search in frustration: not a single bore-hole had shown traces of oil.

But the Greenlanders were not dissatisfied with the failure. The oil prospectors had intruded into their best fishing waters. Nowhere is nature so sensitive as in the untouched Arctic. A breakdown in the extraction of oil would have had tremendous consequences.

Nevertheless, the search for oil is now again a hot political theme in Greenland. This time, however, drilling is to take place not in the ocean but on land, and not on the west coast but on the sparsely inhabited east coast.

The American firm Arco, which has gained experience in Alaska in looking for oil in the Arctic, is awaiting permission to drill in "Jameson Land." It must hit on rich fields if the search is to be profitable.

Oil transport 600 kilometers north of the Arctic Circle is so costly that by comparison even the expensive North Sea oil seems reasonable. The experts in Greenland's capital, Nuuk, estimate that Arco would have to pump at least a billion barrels out of the ground. Four times as much oil as in the Danish North Sea shelf would have to be found before production pays off, explained Danish minister for Greenland Tom Hoeyem. Arco itself figures the changes of this at 5 to 15 percent."

But for the present Greenland is still hesitating to grant a license to drill. In the background is fear of an oil catastrophe. And should oil be found, how can it be transported out? This could only means supertankers. But Greenland protested strongly against their passage through the drift-ice and Arctic waters when Canada planned to ship gas to Europe in giant tankers: the droning of the vessels would drive away whales and seals and leave thousands of Greenlanders without a livelihood.

Arco wants to see the oil terminal and shipping port built in Hurry Fjord. However, the mayor of Itteqqortoormiit, the next town, opposes these plans with determination.

Scepticism prevails also in the leftist government which rules Greenland. The junior partner in the coalition, the little "inuit Ataqatigiit," even thinks that Greenland should let oil be oil and only think about extracting it again when the raw materials treaty between Denmark and autonomous Greenland is revised. Meanwhile, one partner cannot make a decision about the mineral resources without the other.

"That is a colonialist mentality," says the chairman of Inuit, Arqaluk Lynge. "Why should Denmark share in the decision and get half our wealth? After all, we do not get half of the Danish wealth."

"Greenland's ground for the Greenlanders" is the Inuit battle cry. For the social democratic "Siumut" the head of government, Jonathan Motzfeldt, formulates the same wish somewhat more carefully: "We could well imagine having the right over our subsoil ourselves."

But on this point Denmark's government would not be trifled with. "No dice on that," the former Danish prime minister, Anker Jorgensen, said in rejecting such wishes years ago, and the present conservative government, which in any case has difficulty finding the correct level of discussion with its socialist partners in Greenland, does not confront the wish for a change in the raw materials treaty any more positively.

If the atmosphere is sceptical toward oil exploration, then it is cold and negative when it is a question of uranium. Does Greenland actually dispose of Europe's largest uranium deposits? "They are probably not very large deposits," the "Hjemmestyre," the self-government organ in Nuuk reported cautiously. It is certain that there is uranium in Narssaq on the southern point, even though it is not particularly pure. The Danish atomic experimental station Risoe, which ships rocks containing uranium to Denmark for testing, has problems filtering out the valuable raw material.

However, there too environmental problems put a stop to exploitation. "Canadian experiences show that uranium mining destroys the fauna," says Hans Pavia Rosing, Chairman of the "Inuit Circumpolar Conference," in which the Inuit Eskimos from Alaska, Canada and Greenland cooperate. "That alarmed the Greenlanders very much."

"Urani? Naamik" (uranium? no thanks) stand on the posters with the laughing sun, otherwise devoted to opposition to atomic energy, which young Green-landers carry through Nuuk. "Uranium is in the right place where it is," says Jonathan Motzfeldt.

Only the bourgeois "Atassut" Party, Greenland's political opposition, is of the opinion that the country should make use of its natural riches. "The minerals should be our stock," says Lars Chemnitz, the Nestor of Greenland politics.

The 670 million kroner per year that Denmark puts at the free disposal of Greenland as a "block subsidy" make up half of all Greenland's receipts—and they are only a third of the total sum that Denmark pumps into its northern outpost.

The State pays as much again for activities that Copenhagen still administers in lieu of Nuuk: hospital facilities, say, or the police. And it spends a further 600 million for construction, housing, ports and roads. Altogether Denmark provides Greenland with 2.1 billion kroner in subsidies.

Thus, new sources of revenue for the Greenlanders are not to be sneezed at, says "Atassut." They think it a Greenland paradox that it is the very parties which reject these revenues that have written greater independence from Denmark on their banners.

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TECHNOLOGICAL 'JOBKILLING' FEARS UNFOUNDED

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 6/7 Jul 84 p 5

[Text] More composure in the discussion of the technological competitiveness of German industry is needed, according to DIHT President Otto Wolff of Amerongen. For the variety of German exports is marked now as before by breadth of offering, balance, and high technological quality as well as dependability of delivery. It also fits the law of international distribution of labor, which says that one cannot always and everywhere be in first place.

At the same time, Wolff stressed the point before the Chamber of Commerce in Berlin that the recent strikes have noticeably damaged Germany's image abroad because of the delays in delivery caused by the drop in production. After all, he said, "Made in Germany" stands not only for product quality, but also for industriousness and the will to accomplish. In order to improve our image abroad, then, Wolff urges -- with a view to social approval -- the renewal of the Concerted Actions.

This above all because the theme of technology and competitiveness is at present treated more emotionally than professionally, particularly because of its implications for growth and employment. The jobkilling fears of the unions because of the introduction of new technologies is not plausible, according to Wolff.

At any rate the claimed connection between the increase of work productivity from new technologies and the decline of employment in recent years has not been proven in practice. On the contrary, he said, countries with the greatest innovative thrusts and high growths in productivity such as Japan and the U.S., for example, have also created the highest growth rates and the most jobs because their profitability has not been harmed by too high real wage demands.

In order to succeed in taking the path into the third industrial developmental phase as smoothly as possible, in Wolff's words, professional training must also particularly take part. In this connection, Wolff urges the firms to a renewed effort in providing apprenticeships.

The unchanged high demand comes to a great extent from the growing interest of the high school graduates in industrial training. Industry should therefore respond to this with the corresponding supply, for it cannot be in its interest for the burden of providing jobs for badly trained university graduates to become larger. In addition, the firms will need more and more highly qualified workers in the years to come, particularly in the high-tech area. Here above all it is a matter of the application of research results and acquired knowledge in practice, he said.

Further training will also be an important part in the process from innovation to application in production and in the office. For here there is some catching up to be done. But in this connection Wolff spoke decisively against the buildup of further education as a panacea for mistaken decisions in educational policy.

"We must not get used to," Wolff said, "further education being thought of as a measure against unemployment." To be sure the unemployed would beyond doubt strain the further education market in the coming years. However the preventive character of further education as a future standard must particularly not be undermined — in spite of sensible training measures, and although many unemployed can afterwards find new activity.

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ECONOMIC

GROWTH PROSPECTS IN TECHNOLOGY

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 29 Jun 84 p 3

[Text] German industry has in its history many proofs of innovative strength and competitiveness, and nothing has basically changed in this at present. This is the opinion of Professor K.H. Beckurts, member of the Siemens board of directors, at the meeting of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research.

At the same time there is not the slightest reason for self satisfaction, for only with considerably reinforced efforts will the German economy succeed in meeting the American and Japanese challenge in high technology products, Beckurts stressed. He emphasized the unbroken competitive strength of the German industry in traditional working areas.

The more the high technology area is studied, the more favorable the competitive position of German industry appears. On the other hand, the market share loss above all in the top technology of the electronics spectrum in the last ten years is unmistakable. Beckurts pointed out that the situation is quite different according to branches and individual firms within a branch. Foreign trade development has been unfavorable above all in three sectors: 1. in office machines and in data processing, 2. in electronic construction parts, and 3. in entertainment electronics. Groups of goods with high growth potential are too weakly represented in German exports and in the German industry overall. In this connection, the chief of development at Siemens, Beckurt, presented six problem areas:

- 1. The slowing development in investments since the 1970's.
- 2. The effort in microelectronics that was too little and too late. It is not without justification that a fundamental weakness is suspected in microelectronics and biotechnology.
- 3. An often defensive attitude in research and development in the Federal Republic in several strategic technological fields.
- 4. Too few new technologically oriented firms and their relatively slow growth.

- 5. Lack of acceptance from parts of the population for new technologies and developments.
- 6. The relationship between university research and industry, which long has been disturbed.

The high technology branches have in Beckurts' opinion overall favorable prospects for growth that are in every way combinable with the basic strengths of German industry.

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ECONOMIC

INNOVATION, MODERNIZATION, STRENGTHS

Duesseldort HANDELSBLATT in German 28 Jun 84 p 2

[Text] Often the critical consideration of the chances and risks of new technologies, above all in the U.S. and Japan, leads to the judgment that the Federal Republic is weak in innovation. In a comprehensive study, however, the Ifo-Institute comes to the conclusion: There is no question of a general weakness in innovation in the Federal Republic or of a reduction in modernization activities.

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Thus, to be sure, on the basis of the noticeably slower investment growth in the 1970's, the average age of the economic production apparatus did not decline as in the 1960's, but rose slightly. But this cannot be taken as an indication of an "extreme age of capital goods," Ifo said.

A realistic look shows that at the beginning of the 1980's 21 percent of the gross national product was invested in new plants. At the beginning of the 1970's it was 24 percent. But this decline was caused completely by the lower construction investments. The share of more decisive equipment investments remained even at the beginning of the 1980's at a level corresponding to the average of the years 1970 to 1974, even higher than in the 1960's, although the total economic growth has clearly slowed in this time period.

In the equipment area, goods with relatively strong automative character are coming forward; above all, office automation was forced. Because of the investments in modernization, the productivity of the capital goods on hand was increased. Ifo concludes that the available capital goods of the German economy offer a good starting point to keep step in international competition.

Here not only modern production technology, but also a good position in innovation competion in products plays a decisive role. Ifo tries to prove that the innovation power of the German firms is all in all unbroken, and that just recently it has received a new stimulus. A critical self-evaluation, as is often done in the Federal Republic, is no indication of weakness in innovation. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that American and Japanese firms in selected high technologies can claim top performances that deserve unreserved recognition. Generally there was no lack of product and process innovation in the Federal Republic that led to limited technological progress.

In the so-called high technology areas, expenditures for innovation are directed above all toward product innovations. Firms that planned a basic restructuring of their production program realized that greater economic chances opened up for them in innovative growth areas than in price competition with products on hand.

Within the high technology areas this applies above all to the construction goods industry and for communications technology. Both areas belong to the forerunners among the innovators that before long are supposed to bring new products on the market.

Above all it seems that general economic conditions preventing innovative activities have been removed. The firms had to be enabled, by means of economic and finance policy measures and on the basis of a better system of capital investment, to carry out high-risk innovation projects, Ifo said.

On the basis of an Ifo investigation the German industry has in general been able to assert its good position in international technological competition. But it could not be overlooked that electronics was relatively weak. On the basis of international patent data, there is a microelectronic gap between the German industry and the U.S., and also in certain sectors between Germany and Japan.

However the Federal Republic stands before Japan in patent statistics in second place. This applies also to key patents. However, while the Federal Republic has been able to hold its position, the Americans have increased their share even more. The successes of Japanese research are reflected in a growth rate of 88 percent in the last ten years. In key patents, however, Japan's growth rates lie at the world average, and its absolute share is 3.1 percent lower. An international comparison of key patents, that is, inventions that are reported worldwide in at least 15 countries, indicates that the German firms have no offensive worldwide marketing of their innovations in mind as can be observed for the U.S.

9124

CSO: 3620/394

TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITIVENESS STILL INTACT

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 12 Jul 84 p 29

[Text] The German economy has a relatively good position on the most important world markets at present. This is the judgment of the Federal Ministry of Economics in a study on competitiveness, which Federal Economics Minister Martin Bangemann just presented in Bonn. In the opinion of the ministry, there is no reason to fall into a "technology complex." Now as before the German concerns have strong market positions, even in high technology.

The study under the title "High Technology and International Competitiveness of the German Economy" argues against the idea that has often been expressed in recent years that the economy, particularly in the area of high technology, has fallen decisively behind countries such as Japan and the U.S. It is precisely in products of high technological content that the traditional strength of the German range of exports is clear. To this group belongs a great breadth of supply of capital goods of high technological quality. There is also good ability to adapt in the solving of problems and the intelligent use of high-tech products (no matter whether of domestic or foreign origin) in the whole area of production. On the other hand, certain weaknesses cannot be overlooked. In individual important areas in high technology, German concerns must catch up.

"Dynamics Differentiated"

The ministry summarized its judgment in the sentence: "The situation is good, but the dynamics must be judged differently." The proof that the worsening of the market position in some products may in the future threaten competitiveness is however still not possible. A country such as the Federal Republic does not give up a generally good economic position just because in individual areas other countries have won larger shares of the market. It is neither possible nor desireable, the report said, for the German economy to be present or even leading in all areas of high technology. This would be a bad misunderstanding of the international division of labor. However, the German industry must also be in a position in the future to keep up with the rapid worldwide technological progress and to translate this progress continually into good, marketable products and procedures.

In view of this judgment, the ministry does not at present see any urgent need for action that would be reflected in spectacular measures. There is a warning here against the attempt to make a model of the Japanese successes in catching up in the area of top electronics. The differences in the social systems alone would condemn such an attempt to failure. No special need for catching up is seen in the American economy, whose investment quota now as before is lower than that of the German firms. The decisive plus of the U.S. economy in the area of research and development could not be kept up with in the Federal Republic anyway. In particular, the U.S. firms specializing in high technology profit greatly from the large government expenditures in armament and space travel, and this leads internationally to competitive advantages.

Furthermore, the economics ministry did not consider all the export subsidies, import protection, national promotional programs that are detrimental to competition, or the targeted encouragement of high technology branches in the Federal Republic. According to the report, the most important condition for the assurance and strengthening of competitiveness is rather free world trade. In the area of high-tech goods as well the signal function of international competition must be retained. In spite of all side assistance of the state, the main burden of effort has to fall on the firms themselves. In the future as well they will have to show their competitiveness daily. For this, the following are indispensable: modern capital goods, high investment quota and readiness for innovation, more market orientation in industrial research and development, more flexible organization and management structures, systematic utilization of information, growth in productivity, a feeling for viable future products, and expansion of customers beyond the usual markets.

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FINLAND

SOVIET'S TRADE DEFICIT WITH FINLAND SHOWS SUDDEN LEAP

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Jul 84 p 3

[Unsigned article: "Finland's Surplus in Soviet Trade Shrank Abruptly"]

[Text] The Finnish and Soviet trade surplus which last year aroused bewilderment in Finnish experts on Eastern trade has shrunk to almost nothing at this year's halfway point. The special interest-paying account created to level off the flow of money has five hundred million marks and the normal account 20 million.

Leveling off the surplus will help considerably the negotiations conducted in the autumn on the exchange of goods next year and the years to follow. The negotiation starting points are characterized as appreciably better than the previous time.

In August of last year the surplus at its worst was over six billion marks, and the most alarmed experts offered as a remedy to level off trade, among other things, commerce conducted with fixed amounts of currency.

The reason for the rapid withering of the surplus has been the strongly import-favoring protocol signed in December of last year, in which, among other things, the building companies' contract work in the Soviet Union was substantially reduced.

The new practice or prepayments for ships has also evened off the flow of payments. According to the new system, payments are received at a clearly earlier point in time for ships to be constructed in the Soviet Union.

The Finns now hope that the agreement made for ship prepayments is temporary and that payments for the ships are obtained as costs accumulate.

12327

cso: 3617/197

MINISTRY REPORT URGES COOPERATION WITH SOME JAPANESE INDUSTRIES

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 16 Jul 84 pp 32-33

[Article by Martine Royo: "Better Japanese Than Underdeveloped"]

[Text] Stonewalling the Japanese is finished as a policy. Opening the borders and cooperating are the solution put forth in a report from the Ministry of Industry made public by LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE.

France will be better off colonized than impoverished. That is the bitter yet realistic conclusion that can be read between the lines of a confidential report from the Ministry of Industry titled: "How to Meet the Japanese Challenge." France and the rest of Europe are 10 trains behind Japan and America in the high technology race, but it still has a few up-to-date cars. The trick is to get them coupled onto the right locomotive.

The author of the report, Mr Jean de Menton, the official in charge at 100 Rue de Grenelle, has a good education: he is a doctor of law and a graduate of the Harvard Business School. It is no surprise that the strategy he now proposes for France imitates in part that of the Americans. For months he has piloted a task force made up of hundreds of French industrialists who have literally dissected French industry sector by sector, segment by segment. The conclusions are alarmist. The policy of stonewalling the Japanese is dead. It has only worsened France's technological lag and cut us off from the second largest market in the world. Of course we knew that France was behind, but not that it was completely outdistanced by the United States and Japan in 5 of the 8 key sectors of world trade. They are: electronics, precision equipment, steelmaking, motors and machinery, and basic chemicals.

Bunker Strategy

France has only one really competitive area: transportation equipment. Alas, "To maintain it, France is not benefiting from the advantages afforded by the knowledge of new technologies, of robotics and new materials." The TGV [super high-speed train], the pride of our industry, is in danger of being replaced, even in Europe, by the German magnetic-suspension train.

What is the result? An inescapable foreign-trade deficit that can only get worse if France continues to import high value-added products while selling mainly unsophisticated items. If the French have to tighten their belts a notch every year and buy fewer integrated circuits or videotape recorders, they will condemn themselves to underdevelopment. Let us therefore ally ourselves with Japan. Especially since Japan has already discovered Trojan horses to allow it to produce inside the Common Market and flood France with products by taking advantage of the rules on free circulation of merchandise. This makes the "bunker" strategy a dead duck.

But it is not a matter of opening the borders to anything goes any which way, Mr de Menton's report recommends. The strategy must vary according to the product.

However, these strategies can be put in three large categories. When French industrialists are in a clearly bad position with regard to their Japanese counterparts, "There are no other solutions than to agree to open up 100 percent to Japanese products and investment." This is the case with some robots and small tractors. "France is open to Japanese investment," said Mr Laurent Fabius, minister of Industry, during a recent visit to Japan. While the French position is only "fragile," cooperation is possible, provided first that a balance of trade is struck. In simple terms, that means that the French market must be protected by national or, better yet, European measures. Ah! Now if the EEC could spare us the shame of having to slink into the defendants' box at the GATT [General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs].

This initial strategy that preaches closing the borders or grudging cooperation has to do, of course, with the automobile industry, where the Japanese have a 35-40 percent competitive edge over the Europeans, as they do over the Americans. Paris has maintained a tacit quota on Japanese cars for years. In this report it gets a new blessing.

The same recommendations are made for electronics, where the deficit reached Fr 6 billion in 1982. There is one difference: try to move into Japan by allying with small companies controlling advanced technology; the medium of exchange would be our strong points in software.

In passing, the report gives short shrift to criticism of Japanese protectionism: the average tariff level is now lower in Japan (3 percent) than in the EEC (4.9 percent). The protected sectors are limited: leather, food cultivation, and government orders. Obviously there are still things like the foreignness of law, customs, and culture and the difficulty of breaking into the system of distribution, as well as the Japanese conviction that everything "made in Japan" is best. It would be nice if the French had that kind of solidarity.

Precautions

At the other extreme on the list of strategies, where French industry is in a strong position, the advice to French industrialists is that of transparently false caution. For fear that Japan might benefit from an uncontrolled technology transfer, independence is advocated. This is the case particularly for atomic energy, space, aeronautics, and weaponry. Caution is also advised in sectors such as trains or railways, where the Japanese are our main competitors.

Even so, where French industry is in a strong position it has the green light to make agreements. One, for example, would combine our technology and Japanese marketing in markets outside either country, e.g. in telecommunications. In space, too, since the Ariane will be a Franco-European project for the short term. But for the long term, the advice is to join with Japan for the big space programs of the next century. The third main strategy applies when France and Japan are in positions of equality. That is when agreements are best justified, as in commerce, technology or industry. The French may have a technological lead and the Japanese a large market share, or the situation may be reversed.

In the cases of food growing and pharmaceuticals, where the Japanese are mainly clients, French companies are advised to move into Japan, preferably with the help of a native company, as BSN-Gervais-Danone did with Ajinomoto a few years ago.

This latter strategy strongly resembles that of the United States. In 1983 more than 2,000 agreements were concluded between Americans and Japanese; the vast majority were in leading technology sectors (microelectronics, telecommunications, robotics, biotechnology and nuclear technology), often in the form of joint ventures. For example, General Motors and Fujitsu-Fanuc have created a joint subsidiary to produce and sell assembly-line robots. Even armaments and aeronautics are the subject of guideline agreements. Washington and Tokyo have set up a committee for cooperation in high technology. Its objective is to help bring possible partners together.

"They are agreements among equals," says Mr Philippe Delmas, a young professional who spent 2 months in a Silicon Valley laboratory on a research mission for the Analysis and Planning Center at the Quai d'Orsay. (This is a think tank established by Mr Michel Jobert when he reigned at the "Quai"; it is intended to report to the ministry on politics, economics and defense.)

Overcapacity

A third of these agreements are commercial. They mostly involve adapting an American product to the Japanese market and vice-versa. The others are technological agreements that are designed to market a new product in 3 to 5 years from inception.

"Thanks to this cooperation they are cutting the product development cycle in half," Mr Delmas explains. "And they are sharing research and development costs; in the case of microprocessors, for example, these costs double every generation." That is making the competition very hot indeed and is likely to leave old Europe quite out of the running.

"It is useless to try to catch up in integrated circuits and make colossal investments to overcome the cumulative effect," says Mr Delmas. "The Japanese companies themselves are not making much money at it. And it would lead directly to a war of overcapacity."

On the other hand, Europe should move strongly ahead with integrated circuits for telecommunications, a market that accounts for 25-30 percent of integrated circuit sales. Europe is not starting from scratch here, because it is best equipped in "telecoms." But the large European firms capable of launching this venture had better get together. "Is Europe doomed to become a Japanese-American industrial satellite 5-10 years from now?" wonders Mr Jean-Louis Gregorin, director of the CAP [Center for Analysis and Forecasting]. "Europe has not yet lost out," says Mr Delmas. "But it had better not miss the boat." and the second of the second o

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NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS COMPARED TO EUROPE AS A WHOLE

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 16 Jul 84 p 25

[Article by Michel Tardieu: "Multiplicand"]

[Text] Neither France nor Europe can be proud of their industry.

It has been said that talking about the structural nature of the difficulties facing French industry risks undermining the morale of the troops. It would be better to say that the trouble is momentary and that there is light at the end of the tunnel because prices and investment are improving. You have to understand how politicians want to favor wishful thinking or the impatiences that can be useful to them. Journalists do not share their motives. They note that the business situation is gloomy and that it is not just a transitory problem.

The number of sectors in trouble is growing steadily, even where demand has not yet fallen. The flood of foreign cars on the national market is due to a poor choice of models, sometimes a lack of quality, and excessive costs. It is certainly not due to the price of oil or the dollar. It is a fatal illusion to think that French automakers can continue to employ an abundance of insufficiently trained workers while their competitors have well-educated, homogeneous employees.

That is the most striking example, because France has a long tradition; but automobiles are not an isolated case. The entire metal-products industry is sick, not to mention steelmaking, heavy machinery and machine tools. The textile industry has more industries in trouble than centers of profit. Telecommunications has been getting fewer orders and no longer employs a large work force. Coal, shipbuilding and trucking have been awaiting a hypothetical convalescence for decades. The large public corporations SNCF [French National Railroads] and EdF [French Electric [Power] Company] need increasing subsidies.

The barge blockade that hemmed in innocent pleasure craft is spotlighting the case of the SNCF this week. The minister in charge of the SNCF jealously protects his supernumeraries but carefully avoids explaining to creditors how much the railroads are costing them every year. Shipowners thus have a few excuses for shouting about unfair rail competition.

A combination of government support and indulgences and bad habits hides the real state of the French economy. By focusing on this or that business anyone can reach any conclusions he wants. Fortunately, some businesses are still doing well.

Superficial observers refuse to understand that the present situation is serious because all Europe presents the visage of a declining civilization. They are wrong to console themselves by saying, "Germany is not in top shape. It still has its chemistry and machine tools, but it has no avant-garde technology." "If Great Britain didn't have its oil, it would be the poor man of the industrialized countries." True, our neighbors are not, for the most part, in any position to tower over us. But is it any triumph to escape German colonization only to become a Japanese or American protectorate? By liking only simple ideas, political parties forget to say that the Europe they contest among themselves is only a last chance. Even if it were to unite by some miracle, it will lift itself out of its decadence only with considerable effort. It must prune away the countless branches of deadwood that weaken its industries. And it must get to work. It will have to work hard to replace the deadwood with profitable businesses.

France is hardly in a position to set itself up as a social or economic model for the world. The disputes of principle that embitter some great conflicts such as those of Creusot-Loire or Citroen are pathetic. It is chastening to read the articles in the American press on European business. The intelligence of a nation, these days, is multiplied by the microprocessors it produces. Though we lack recent evidence, we tend to think we are the best when it comes to the multiplicand, but we can have no illusions about the multiplier.

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CSO: 3519/437

DETAILS ON DEFICIT IN BALANCE OF TRADE

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 27 Jul-2 Aug 84 p 34

[Excerpt] According to provisional data released by the National Institute of Statistics, between January and May of this year Portuguese imports increased 27.6 percent in value, reaching 462.9 million contos; whereas exports increased 53.3 percent, totaling 286.7 million contos, resulting in a rise in the balance of trade deficit of 0.18 percent, a balance which currently exceeds 176.1 million contos.

These figures represent an inversion in the trend noted in the trade balance since the final quarter of 1982. In fact, the rate of growth in imports has been increasing markedly (19.5 percent during the first 3 months, with respect to the same period last year, 24.3 percent up until April and 27.6 percent up until May); and exactly the opposite happening with exports (a 59.5 percent rise up until March, 55.7 percent the next month and 53.3 percent for the first 5 months of the year).

Hence, the commercial deficit, a variable which the minister of finance and planning, Ernani Lopez just recently considered completely under control, at the time of the submission of the financial and economic recovery plan, has changed from a 19 percent reduction between January and March, and 7.5 percent up until April, to a 0.18 percent increase between January and May; an event which, it should be stressed again, has not happened since the last quarter of 1983, when the government was still headed by Pinto Balsemao.

However, it should be emphasized that these figures are actually very provisional, and there will be a trend toward a rise in the deficit when the final figures have been ascertained; because the movement of imports is always more difficult to count than that of exports.

As a result of this change, the rate of coverage of imports by exports has also declined, dropping from 65.5 percent in March to 63.1 percent in April and 61.9 percent in May.

Deficit With the U.S.: 60 Million

By May, the positive balance in the trade relations between Portugal and the EEC declined by 7.4 million. At the same time, the deficit with the Federal

Republic of Germany increased (from 1.2 million to 4.1 million contos) as did the one with Italy (from 6.7 million to 10.2 million contos); but there was also an increase in the positive balances with the United Kingdom (from 7.2 million to 11.3 million contos) and with France (from 2.5 million to 3 million contos).

The balance with the EFTA countries continues to be positive, having risen from 9.8 million to 10.3 million contos; and this trend has also been maintained with respect to the countries associated with the former escudo zone (from 7.4 million to 11.7 million contos).

However, the imbalance with the OPEC countries has been increasing, now totaling 76.8 million contos, or 18 million contos more than from January to May 1983 (58.4 million contos).

The United States of America continues to be by far the leading supplier to Portugal, with imports amounting to 80.7 million contos (17.4 percent of the total imports) between January and May; in other words, 28 million more contos than during the very same period last year.

It is followed by the Federal Republic of Germany, which accounts for 9.7 percent of the total purchased abroad (44.8 million contos); the United Kingdom (7.08 percent, and 32.7 million contos); France (7.05 percent, and 32.6 million contos); Saudi Arabia (6.1 percent, and 28.3 million contos); and Spain (5.4 percent, and 25.4 million contos).

The largest customer for Portuguese products is the United Kingdom (15.3 percent of the total, and 44.1 million contos worth of goods purchased); followed by the Federal Republic of Germany (14.2 percent, and 40.7 million contos); France (12.4 percent, and 35.6 million contos); the United States (7 percent, and 20.2 million contos); the Netherlands (6.4 percent, and 18.4 million contos); and Spain (4.1 percent, and 12 million contos).

The heaviest commercial deficits have occurred with the United States (60.4 million contos), Saudi Arabia (27.3 million contos), Spain (13.4 million contos), Nigeria (12 million), Iran (11.8 million), Iraq (11.4 million) and Italy (10.2 million contos).

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cso: 3542/93

NUMBER OF BANKRUPTCIES INCREASED IN 1983

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Jul 84 p 18

[Text] A study recently released by COSEC (Credit Insurance Company) comments that the total number of bankruptcy judgments in 1983 showed a 27.7 percent increase, retaining the trend noted the previous year toward a worsening of the situation.

Last year 129 bankruptcy judgments were handed down, a number similar to that reached in 1979 (124), and considerably higher than those recorded in 1980 and 1981 (82 and 73, respectively). The trend toward an exacerbation began to be noticed in 1982, when 101 productive units were considered to be bankrupt.

Moreover, a "larger dimension" seems to be noted in the companies that have failed, in view of the increase observed in the capital stock involved (nearly 4,000 contos on the average during 1983, in comparison with figures under 3,000 contos during previous years).

As for this year, the situation could be even more alarming. In fact, the data released afford the conclusion that during the first 3 months, the number of failures doubled with respect to those of the very same period in 1983; added to the fact that, given the domestic economic situation at present, a worsening of the state of financial failure may be predicted among the companies in trouble, with the resultant increase in declarations of bankruptcy.

Of the 129 business firms which failed last year, data have been published only on 94, which employed a total of 5,342 workers. Of these, nearly 33 percent (1,763) were associated with the textile industry, 18.5 percent (990) with civil construction and 8.9 percent (470) with furniture and footwear.

The manufacturing industries continue to be the sector most affected, with 51.9 percent of the bankruptcies recorded last year, and particular stress on textiles, lumber, furniture, cork and food. The deterioration of the construction and public works sector has also been confirmed, with 7 percent of the bankruptcies in 1983.

Despite the increase noted in the average capital stock involved, there is every indication that the companies affected were of small or medium size, each one employing nearly 60 workers, on the average.
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ECONOMIC PORTUGAL

LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE FEARED WITH EEC MEMBERSHIP

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 17 Jul 84 p 19

[Article by Miguel Teixeira e Melo: "The Cost of Joining Europe"]

[Text] Francois Mitterrand came to Lisbon to announce to the Portuguese the decision taken at the Fontainebleau summit to the effect that the membership of Portugal in the EEC will become effective 1 January 1986.

What was expressed jointly now by the European countrires is what each of them separately had reaffirmed more than once. Namely, there is a political willingness on the part of the current members of the Common Market to promote the integration of our country into the body of that organization.

Therefore, up to the moment there is nothing new in that regard.

It will be of interest to us at the opportune moment to learn the real content of the agreement we may come to establish with the EEC. In fact, only then will we know the rules and discipline to which the economic and political relations of our country with the current Europe of Nine will be subject.

The norms to be established will certainly be so restricted and limited in terms of a situation of full economic integration that in fact it will continue not to exist between Portugal and Europe.

That means that the enormous structural disparities between the Portuguese economy and those of the European nations will lead the future relation—ship of our country with Europe to a mere development of the one already existing in the commercial area or in the framework of cooperation in other areas. This is not called integration, nor does this process appear to be essential. For a long time we have expressed our position on this problem in what we believe to be a clear manner.

We believe that the process of rapprochement of our country with Europe is susceptible of jeopardizing national independence itself. Furthermore, Europe today is not the sphere of economic freedom which those who conceived it [EEC] decades ago may have dreamed about. On the contrary, socializing bureaucracy has spread everywhere, constituting a real stain in European societies today.

Because we greatly prize the independence of our country and because we believe that only an economic system with liberal roots is capable of permitting national economic development, we do not see any reason to change in any way what we have always thought about the European option maintained by the 25 April regime.

It is appropriate to recall, as we have already done on other occasions, that implementation of the integration process depended for its very initiation on the observance of a basic condition: the political abandonment of the overseas territories.

All of this was always very clear to us, before and after 25 April. This is without a doubt a point that still rallies the supporters of the regime today, a fact that must be clearly stated.

Ten years having passed since 25 April, and despite our subservience to Europe and its interests, only now is it announced that this dream so dear to our democrats will be implemented approximately 18 months from now.

It is necessary to overthrow an authoritarian regime which Common Market Europe would not accept in its midst.

It became necessary to submit to the yoke of Soviet-style imperialism about 15 million Portuguese who lived in the almost 2 million square kilometers of overseas Portugal. A unique (and also the last?) opportunity to build a pluricotinental nation possessing natural resources that overall would have put it on a par with any world power was lost. We jettisoned the "heavy inheritance" comprised of foreign currency reserves which were among the largest in the world. The country was forced to convey a part of the gold of the same "heavy inheritance" and to pledge part of the rest.

And now, 10 years later, when the misery that was removed from Portuguese social life along with the Estado Novo is again present in our collective life, they want to see us rejoice over the forthcoming membership in the EEC!

The price we paid for our journey to Europe is succintly expressed in what we said above. What we are going to have to pay from here on can go as far as the loss of national independence.

Francois Mitterrand came to Lisbon not only to bring us the news about the Fontainebleau summit but mainly to allow his comrade Mario Soares to derive the political effects he lacks on the domestic level.

Excepting Dr Alvaro Cunhal, who is a simple functionary of the Portuguese branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the present prime minister must undoubtedly be the national political leader with the greatest and heaviest responsibilities in the current Portuguese situation.

Therefore, it suits him well to head the government executive branch when it is announced that a common objective of all the defenders of the April regime will be consummated soon: the European integration of what remains of Portugal.

According to published reports about the results of the Fontainebleau Conference, our country will have a period of 10 years counting from 1 January 1966 until its full integration in Europe is consummated. This means that by the time we get there, about 22 years will have passed since the 25 April Revolution.

This long period of time serves to unmask the argument of those who made the authoritarianism of the regime deposed in April 1974 one of the fundamental reasons (if not the only one) for our political exclusion from Europe.

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It can never be reiterated enough that our distrust and even opposition to the process of the integration of Portugal into Europe should not be understood as support for any perspective of economic autonomy that would lead to the Albanization of the country.

On the contrary, we always advocated that we whould lend impetus to commercial and other relations not only with Europe but also with other areas and regions provided that they result in benefits to Portugal. It is simply that what they want to make us enter now is not a mere process of economic and commercial relationship. No. We will assume political commitments and subject ourselves to rules that restrict our freedom as an independent nation and thus, even from a purely economic perspective of debit and credit the results envisaged are not favorable or auspicious.

Those who always saw in the overseas territories the sure and solid base on which the independence of the vast country we were until 25 April 1974 are doubly right.

It remains for us now to trust that Divine Providence will pity us and our descendants so that the approaching hardships may be minimized.

The official reaction to Francois Mitterrand's short visit to Portugal is a clear and evident example of the most abject provincialism.

That is undoubtedly another very clear symptom of national decadence. In this respite of summer vacations, it would be well if we were to become aware of the fact that we have entered a new phase of a process about which the best we can say is that no one honestly knows how it is going to end.

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BRIEFS

30 PERCENT INFLATION PROBABLE—The Consumer Price Index rose 3.2 percent in June after having dropped slightly (1 percent) last May. Transportation was the item mainly responsible for relaunching the inflation rate, which is likely to exceed 30 percent in the course of 1984. The 30 percent barrier has really been surpassed already in terms of the inflation rate for the last 12 months including June. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 14 Jul 84 p 1] 8711

REDUCED BALANCE OF TRADE DEFICIT -- In the first 5 months, the trade deficit reached \$1.3 billion, which was \$600 million less than the deficit accrued during the 1983 period. The reduction of almost one-third was due basically to the reduction of imports (minus 10.5 percent) and maintenance of a good rate of growth of exports (plus 8 percent). However, the rate of coverage of imports by exports dropped another point, going from 63 percent to 62 percent from April to May. Despite the good performance of the trade balance, the slowdown of the rate of growth of exports is already well known; in themeantime, it is expected that there will soon be an acceleration of imports due to the triple effect of reduction of the import surtax, the drop in interest rates and the need to replace stocks which the companies have reduced to the minimum. Meanwhile, the services, specifically tourism, have improved their position favorable to Portugal, thus contributing to a smaller deficit in the balance of current transactions. The trade deficit for the first 5 months of this year amounted to 176 million contos compared to 175 million for a similar period last year. The devaluation of the escudo in terms of the dollar is responsible for this fictitious worsening which in reality hides a substantial improvement. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 14 Jul 84 p 1] 8711

RISE IN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS—Direct foreign investment in Portugal increased 22 percent in the first 5 months of this year compared to the same period last year. From January to May of this year, foreign investment amounted to \$45,238,000 (6.1 million contos). The chairman of the Foreign Institute revealed that there are still 188 transactions underway totaling 19 million contos. About 60 percent of the investment comes from the EEC countries, with the trend of a greater flow to the services sector being maintained. [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 17 Jul 84 p 18] 8711

CSO: 3542/86

ECONOMIC SPAIN

LACK OF MADRID-AGRARIAN SECTOR CONSULTATION OVER EEC

Madrid ABC in Spanish 22 Jul 84 p 62

[Article by Jovellanos]

[Text] Businessmen in the agricultural sector, along with those of the food industry, are on tenterhooks about the negotiations being conducted by the Spanish Government with the European Economic Community on the subject of Spain's membership. And they are on tenterhooks because neither the secretary of state, Mr. Marin, nor the minister of agriculture, Mr. Romero, are maintaining contact with them as they should to keep them informed of the steps being taken and the positions of both sides on those burning issues which will determine the future of many agricultural businessmen and industrialists associated with production in this sector.

It is generally known that the recurrent themes in the negotiations for our entry into the Common Market are focused on the conditions they wish to impose upon the agricultural and fishing sectors. In both sectors, our potential is causing Community leaders to fear the competition of Spanish production; and they are attempting to impose the "might is right" rule upon us.

Simultaneously with the efforts being exerted by the CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] on behalf of Spanish businessmen, which have been sufficiently demonstrated on several occasions in statements made by its previous president, Mr. Ferrer, and its current president, Mr. Cuevas, an Interprofessional Agro-Food Committee (CIA) has been established. The committee held a press conference on 19 July to publicize its objectives.

The following organizations are participating in this committee, which is exclusively professional in nature and has no political ties: National Confederation of Farmers and Livestock Growers (CNAG); National Young Farmers Center (CNJA); Union of Agricultural Federations of Spain (UFADE); General Association of Livestock Growers of the Kingdom; Spanish Association of Industrial Poultry Dressers (AMIAVE); Spanish Association of Meat Enterprises (ASOCARNE); General Association of Sugar Manufacturers; Onesimo Redondo Sugar Cooeprative Company (ACOR); National Association of Swine Growers (ANPROGAPOR); National Association of Cheese and Butter Manufacturers; Association of Certified Milk Producers (APLECO; National Federation of Milk Industries;

National Trade Union Poultry Association; Citrus Exports Management Committee; Spanish Confederation of Ornamental Horticulturists; Levantine Cotton Producers Cooperative; National Agricultural Cooperative (UNACO); National Federation of Spanish Wine-Growing Exporters; Olive-Growing sector; ANECOOP Cooperative Company; Spanish Group of Manufacturers of Tomato Pastes and Their Derivatives (AGRUTON): Spanish Confederation of Manufacturers of Fodder Compounds. National Association of Cotton Gin Cooperatives; APAS Federation; and CN [?National Center] of Sugar Beet and Sugarcane Growers.

During its press conference, the CIA stated its views that the government should remember it is negotiating as representatives of the country's interests. Alleged reasons of state can never be in opposition to the general interests of the citizens whom that state must serve. At no time was there real consultation with the agricultural sector, and the concessions admissible in any negotiation were not coordinated with the professional sectors. What is at stake is the survival and development of the nation and not an agreement which subordinates us to supranational interests. And before making any decision in matters which include international commitments that inevitably will have importance for the life of the country, the government should report the reality of the problems inherent in such commitments and find guarantees and safeguard formulas for each and every one of the legitimate interests at stake.

The CIA considers the following subjects to be of extreme seriousness and concern: reduction in the cultivation of olives and grapes through imposition of production controls; imposition of quotas on milk production, thus penalizing the Spanish livestock sector and forcing contributions to the financing of European surpluses; the possibility of being a producer of grain surpluses through reduction of livestock holdings; the unfeasibility of growing sugar beets in the face of low Spanish yields and the situation of the sugar industry; discriminatory treatment of our horticultural fruit-growing production as the result of French demands; inclusion of citrus fruits among the Community's appreciable products, even though there is insufficient production in all countries. With regard to citrus fruits, it is well known that Israel as well as the Arab countries of North Africa have established treaties with the EEC which have a serious impact on us. The problem in our production of pork, whose presence in their markets is unacceptable to members of the Community, while we have to accept theirs [sic]. Taking into account the differences in the rates of inflation of Spain and other EEC countries, it is necessary to know what the government's future action is going to be in a Common Market where the inflationary effect alone can ruin our competitive capability.

The committee—in which all the member organizations are equal—stated that if the government continues to ignore the real problems affecting the viability of many sectors, there would be no solution other than to convey its concerns to the public.

There has never been a concentration of agricultural and food interests like that which has taken place with the establishment of this Interprofessional Agro-

Food Committee; and, given the Spanish individualist idiosyncrasy, this demonstrates the extremely serious danger which, in the immediate future, threatens the Spanish agricultural sector if the government puts the nation's economic and social interests second to interests of a political kind.

8143 CSO: 3548/299

PUBLIC ENTERPRISE LOSSES DRAW SOLCHAGA'S FIRE

Madrid YA in Spanish 22 Jul 84 p 23

[Article by Jesus F. Briceno]

[Text] Next week it will be a year since Carlos Solchaga, minister of industry, denounced the lamentable general state of the public enterprises. The minister saw the urgent and decisive need of altering their course, threatened those enterprise heads experiencing the highest deficits with dismissal if they did not reverse their shortfalls, and announced the privatization once more of various enterprises belonging to the INI [National Institute of Industry]. A year later these promises are still awaiting implementation.

On Tuesday the president of the INI will make public the results of fiscal 1983 which, according to what Enrique Moya stated before the Industry Committee of the Congress, anticipate losses of 192 billion pesetas, 60 billion above those registered in the previous fiscal year.

Except in the case of the chairman of the Altos Hormos del Mediterranes enterprise and ENSIDESA [National Iron and Steel Enterprise, Inc.], Jose Maria de Lucia (who was dismissed for failing to exercise authority with the workers of Segunto), the UNI has not removed from their positions since February 1983 those in charge of deficit-yielding enterprises even though some of them, such as Iberia Airlines, have doubled their losses. Those chairmen who left have done so because they are being paid more in the private sector rather than because of any decision by the minister of industry.

At that meeting, held on 28 and 29 July 1983 at the offices of the National Institute of Industry, Carlos Solchaga noted before the heads of INI enterprises that "for every million pesetas assigned to cover losses, there are two additional unemployed persons without a minimum level of livelihood or there is a last opportunity to improve the country's educational and public health standards."

To Disinvest and Reprivatize

The minister of industry announced that the holding company should disinvest and reprivatize enterprises, these being plans that are still to be executed

and from which the minister of industry has desisted, given that the capitalization of enterprises for 1984 is 160 billion pesetas compared to 75.8 billion in 1983.

Specifically, the minister said that "public enterprise in general was one of the problems, or if one chooses to put it another way, one of the matters that the country has to solve or settle, and the need to face this unresolved issue is especially important for a socialist government which believes in the possibility of an efficient and competitive public sector that can additionally be an instrument to check the economic crisis."

Carlos Solchaga mentioned enterprises such as SEAT [Spanish Passenger Car Company], Iberia Airlines, or ENASA [National Trucking Company], in addition to those of the food industry group operating in sectors where their competitors, Spanish and foreign, are making money. The losses of the enterprises in the food-producing group of the INI were 3 billion pesetas in 1983 and the latest project of the INI in this respect consists in the creation of a food miniholding company which will have to be approved by the Council of Ministers and which would in turn operate ENDIASA [National Food-Producing Enterprise].

Losses Increase

In 1982 the National Institute of Industry lost 137 billion pesetas (even though Carlos Bustelo had announced in advance that the deficits only totaled 102 billion pesetas). During 1983, under the administration of the socialist government, given that early in the year half of the holding company enterprise chairmen were removed from under its jurisdiction, the estimated losses reached 192 billion pesetas according to the head of the INI himself, Enrique Moya.

The group of 65 enterprises in which the INI is directly involved lost 160 billion pesetas in 1983, to which should be added 32 billion more as a consequence of applying some very tight accounting criteria which disclose as real losses work in progress that was included for years as assets but which in fact represent irrecoverable investments, according to what Enrique Moya told the congress.

These results, much more pessimistic than those anticipated, were attributed by the head of the INI to historic deficiencies accumulated over many years during which investments that subsequently proved to be worthless were made in order to take advantage of the possibility of obtaining very inexpensive credits. According to these assertions, the INI enterprises produce much more than the market demands, and on occasion even the market does not need the products that are turned out.

Iberia and SEAT

During the past fiscal year, Iberia and SEAT alone lost 63 billion pesetas between them. If we add to that the 30 billion loss of HUNOSA [National Northern Coal Enterprise], INI's outlook is dismal. Iberia and SEAT are

two enterprises that do not belong to sectors in worldwide recession, but the airline company could see its losses in 1984 increased threefold compared to those it incurred 2 years ago. In a dozen other public enterprises, payroll expenses exceed the units' losses, for which reason it would be more profitable to suspend production and send the workers' pay to their homes.

However, apart from criticisms, INI sources stress that the margin of freedom left to the heads of the holding company enterprises is very limited, especially if the manpower reorganization program is not carried out and 20,000 jobs are not eliminated.

2662

CSO: 3548/298

BANK OF SPAIN'S RUBIO OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ECONOMIC UPTURN

Madrid ABC in Spanish 25 Jul 84 p 47

[Article by Rosa Ovejero: "Mariano Rubio: 'We Can Begin Recovery Phase'"]

[Text] Madrid--"For the first time in a decade, the first signs that we can begin a recovery phase to help solve the great problem of unemployment appear on the horizon." The new governor of the Bank of Spain, Mariano Rubio, stated this yesterday when taking office. Felipe Gonzalez presided over the ceremony attended by the major bankers.

According to Mariano Rubio, the execution of a monetary policy that made it possible to fulfill the economic objective of modifying the basic financial imbalances made this recovery possible despite the fact that some have called it monetaristic. In his past position as assistant governor, Mariano Rubio examined the behavior of the central bank in recent years. He stated that since he was appointed in 1977, he has not known of any attempt to interfere in the execution of the financial policy. On the contrary, the successive ministers of economy have respected the bank's freedom of action within the general framework established by the government.

This has been possible, according to him, because of the law on governing organs of the bank. This gave it a special statute which stipulated its autonomy in the execution of the monetary policy guidelines and established some provisional laws to insure the independence of its governing organs. He said that the bank has always been aware of its role and has managed to help those responsible for the economic policy.

The new governor called the bank crisis the hardest stage of the central bank. It would not have been able to overcome it without the autonomy and confidence that the government has given it. According to Mariano Rubio, the interests of Spain and never partisan interests have prevailed in the resolution of this crisis.

The governor who began to work in the central bank 19 years ago defined improvement of its cadres and their professionalization as the key to the strength of the bank.

He thanked the members of the government present at the inauguration presided over by Felipe Gonzalez for having ignored the criticisms of the monetary policy. He asked that they turn deaf ears to those who want the government to take the easy road since the Spanish economy's only future lies in stability.

Finally he said goodbye to his predecessor, Jose Ramon Alvarez Rendueles. He pointed out that during Rendueles' 6-year term, the Bank of Spain has been consolidated as a central bank. Rendueles performed the task of propelling and leading the new institutional plan of the bank, the system of bank supervision and liberalization of the financial system.

From his new position which is, in his words, the culmination of his professional life, Mariano Rubio offered the bank's collaboration to the government in the execution of the monetary policy.

The departing governor, Jose Ramon Alvarez Rendueles, stated his satisfaction in the work done at the Bank of Spain. It "has become more independent and stronger and has a voice in the Spanish economy." He stated that the monetary policy had acquired credibility and demonstrated its effectiveness in recent years.

The inauguration was attended by members of the government, presidents and top officials of most of the banks in the country and advisers and top officials of the Bank of Spain. Juan Antonio Ruiz de Alda, the new assistant governor and currently secretary general of the Deposits Guarantee Fund, was appointed by the Council of Ministers in the morning. The man who had been "reported" as top contender, Raimundo Ortega, director general of the Treasury and Financial Policy, will continue in this position which designs the current monetary policy that the central bank will carry out. Both were present at the inauguration.

7717

CSO: 3548/301

INI'S MOYA LOOKS TO CURBING INCREASING LOSSES

Madrid ABC in Spanish 25 Jul 84 p 49

[Text] Madrid--Enrique Moya, president of the INI [National Institute of Industry], expects that the line of increasing losses that the INI has recorded since 1978 will be broken in 1984. For the first time this year, it will lose less than the previous year (160 billion). He announced this in a press conference he held yesterday in which he presented the INI results for 1983.

Moya went into details, commenting: "Naturally, at this point in the year there are many unknowns like the success of industrial reconversion and its timetable, the evolution of parity between the peseta and the dollar, etc." One of the achievements the INI president pointed out is the slower growth in the percentage of losses recorded in the last fiscal year. In 1982 they increased 28.7 percent compared to the previous year. In 1983 this percentage was 17.1 percent. In his opinion, there has been improvement in reference to INI activities, increased measures of austerity and reduction of expenses.

The information supplied to the press shows that, for 1984, INI officials expect results before taxes, assuming the uncertainties mentioned above evolve normally compared to 1983. They expect to achieve improvements in 40 enterprises in the following sectors: automotive, air transportation, aluminum, fertilizer, maritime transportation, defense, food, electronics and information and miscellaneous. They expect to achieve similar results in electrical energy and steel. Results will be worse in ship construction, mining and capital equipment.

According to Enrique Moya, the INI has already begun to solve the financial imbalance problem. He commented that for the INI to be competitive, the ideal percentage would be based on having 40 percent of its own resources and the rest from other resources. He said later: "If we do not manage to fulfill the objectives included in the financial improvement plan, it will not be possible to improve the results of the group."

Referring to the effect that the state budget contributions to the INI can have, he categorically denied that these could increase the public deficit.

The INI received a total of 224 billion pesetas in 1982, 191 billion last year and will receive 202 billion in 1984.

At another point in the press conference, the INI president emphasized the impact that financial costs have on INI results.

Net Results of INI

<u>Year</u>	Billions of Pesetas	Percentage Increase
1980 1981 1982 1983	-107.1 -137.9	69.0 20.7 28.7 17.1

7717 CSO: 3548/301 ELECTRIC POWER EXCHANGING AMONG NORDIC COUNTRIES INCREASING

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Jul 84 p 22

[Unsigned article: "Electricity Exchange Increases Among Nordic Countries"]

[Text] Savonlinna (HELSINGIN SANOMAT)--The Nordic countries' central electricity exchange is increasing. Last year's exchange was unprecedented. Norway with its water power was the big net exporter of electricity, while Sweden, Denmark and Finland imported more energy than they exported.

Nordel, the Nordic organ for electric power cooperation, held its annual conference in Savonlinna. Nordel's chairmanship and secretariat were shifted to Finland for three years.

Klaus Ahlstedt, a deputy managing director, was elected chairman of the organization, and Johnny Bistrom from Imatran Voima was elected general secretary.

It is apparent from Nordel's annual report that the Nordic countries' joint electricity production was 275 billion kilowatt-hours. It increased 8.7 percent from the previous year's production. Electricity was generated mostly by water power, 67 percent. Nuclear power's share surpassed 20 percent. Electricity consumption grew in all the Nordic countries, most of all in Sweden, 10.9 percent. Consumption in Finland increased eight percent to 45 billion kilowatt-hours. Twenty-nine percent of it was produced by water power, 37 percent by nuclear power, and nine percent was imported from the Soviet Union.

The electric power exchange between Finland and Sweden saw an import surplus for Finland. Finland exported 679 million kilowatt-hours of electricity and imported from Sweden 1230 million kilowatt-hours, mostly in the latter part of the year.

Exchange within the Nordel framework stresses the countries' water power situation, since it is the most economical form of electricity production. The intercountry exchange takes place at overcapacity according to the most advantageous situation of each moment, so that the required electricity is produced in the cheapest way, generally in hydroelectric and nuclear power plants. Finland has an export surplus in the spring, but in the latter part of the year more electricity is imported than exported.

12327

CSO: 3617/194

PRINOS OIL PROFITS REPORTED

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 2 Jun 84 p 17

/Text/ The Greek petroleum from Prinos brought the state 2 billion 94 million drachmas in 1983, a sum significantly greater than the 1.4 billion gained by the Public Oil Corporation /DEP/ in 1982.

Again this sum was relatively small since the present contract is clearly colonialist in character and provides for a small percentage going to the Greeks from the total amount of oil drawn from the wells.

The value of the oil going to the consortium of foreign companies which exploit the Prinos deposits on the basis of the contract is estimated to be over 8 billion drachmas.

Specifically, under the contract our country receives 19.5 percent of the quantity while 80.5 percent goes to the consortium. The contract, however, will soon be revised. The negotiations have already started.

DEP shows impressive profits in the financial statement to be presented on 20 June at the stockholders' meeting. Specifically, DEP net profits reached 137 million drachmas compared to 27 million the year before. In 1983, the joint profits of the corporation were 2.3 billion compared to 1.5 billion in 1982. DEP spent 2 billion drachmas in exploration and other projects. All together in the 8 years of DEP activity, 10.6 billion drachmas have been spent in exploration.

7520

CSO: 3521/262

BRIEFS

RISE IN FUEL PRICES—Without resorting to "increases," the government yesterday "updated" fuel prices in order to shift to the consumers the 7.1 percent revaluation which the dollar has undergone since the last rise of fuel prices in Portugal (February of this year). In the text of the "updating" regulation, nothing is said about the drop in oil prices that is taking place in the "spot" markets and which concerned the OPEC so much this week. Thus, super will now cost 99.00 escudos; regular—which has practically ceased to have any reason for existence since the price is almost the same as that of super and is going to be richer in octane—will be 96; gasoil, 60; fuel [oil], 27.50; city gas, 22.30 escudos per cubic meter; a 13-kilogram bottle of propane gas will be 900 escudos; and butane gas will be 884 escudos. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 14 Jul 84 p 1] 8711

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ENERGY

INCREASED USE OF NATURAL GAS, ELECTRICITY

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 30 Jun 84 p 29

/Text/ jk. Zofingen, 27 Jun -- Ten years ago natural gas accounted for 1.5 percent of the total national energy supply today it is 7.5 percent. Roland Mages of Vevey, president of the Usogas Cooperative for the promotion of gas, could point to proud achievements at the annual meeting. Dr E. Kiener, director of the Federal Energy Office, presented a comprehensive survey of solved and unsolved problems of energy policies to the assembly of delegates of the Swiss Gas Industry Association, meeting in the same hall. He dwelt at length on the nuclear and energy initiatives.

More Gas For Less Acid Rain

It is held that gas has assumed the major role in energy diversification. R. Mages emphasized that its consumption has increased considerably faster than that of all other sources of energy. While its share in 1974 was only 1.5 percent, it had risen to 6.6 percent by 1982; by 1983 it was already 7.1 percent and further growth is expected. On this occasion the demand to exclude the category of "long-distance heat" from the national energy equation was heard once again. "Long-distance heat" is not a source of energy, but merely a system of distribution. In R. Mages' view, credit for the consumption of gas, electricity, or oil used in the prouduction of long-distance heat should be given to the specific sources of energy involved.

Natural gas, as a substitute for oil, could play an important role not only in the diversification of energy sources. Using the slogan "more gas for less acid rain," R. Mages pointed to the environment-friendly character of natural gas. There are many causes of environmental pollution—one need only recall the eruption of the Mexican volcano El Chichon in April 1982. Within a few days it expelled an enormous quantity of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere which was at least half again as much as the sulfur dioxide currently emitted during an entire year by the 12 most industrialized nations of Western Europe. In order to keep to a minimum the emission of sulfur dioxide caused by man and human activities, one must switch to "a far more general use of natural gas." Proven reserves today are already sufficient to cover demand for half a century The subterranean supply routes are safe and the producing countries are not located in a single crisis—prone region of the world as is true of oil, for instance. Moreover, during the last 10 years Switzerland has constructed an imposing transportation and distribution network at a cost of 1.5 billion france.

To Serve, Not to Direct is the Function of Energy Supply Policy

The guest speaker, Dr E. Kiener, director of the Federal Energy Office, pointed out in his survey that goals formulated by the Commission for All Forms of Energy (GEK) as well as the assumptions for its energy policy remain correct although the various groups differed in their assessment of specific problem areas. The energy policy of the Executive Federal Council, after rejecting the energy legislation, relies on utilizing existing authority. Initial decrees have already been drafted or finalized. Aside from safety measures for transportation and the reduction of the sulfur content in "extra light" heating oil, the following measures concerning structural changes are particularly important: Testing the models for new boilers and burners; mandatory heating controls; regulations relating to building insulation; and finally regulations concerning appropriate design, sizes and operation of heating installations. Neither the Federation nor the cantons expect salvation through a flood of regulations; the understanding and voluntary cooperation of the citizens is also expected. "Gone are the times when bad architecture and lack of expertise in construction technology could be offset by oversized heating and air-conditioning systems" explained Dr E. Kiener. Individual discounts of heating costs also provide a considerable potential for savings and correspond to the concept of the Federation and the cantons that energy policy should serve rather than direct. State interventions are of a technical and economic nature and, in contrast to the nuclear and energy initiatives, do not strive to bring about sociopolitical changes.

"Veiled Social Politics" of the Nuclear and Energy Initiatives

Dr E. Kiener admitted that certain demands of the two initiatives were "worthy of consideation," but that the proposed approach was questionable. Under the headings "for a future without additional nuclear power plants" and "for a safe, economical, and environmentally sound energy supply," which are used to define the initiatives, an attempt is being made to engage in "veiled social politics." The speaker explained carefully that the two initiatives were no basis for a safe, flexible, and responsible energy supply and that it is highly questionable whether the demanded abandonment of this nuclear energy would benefit the environment—after all, one cannot assume that the missing nuclear energy could be offset by economy measures.

Consumption of electricity is steadily increasing. A 6.9 percent rise in consumption was noted last winter. The additional 1.5 billion kWh required, as compared to the demand of the previous winter, correspond to approximately 40 percent of the future winter output of the Leibstadt nuclear power plant. Moreover, last year's severe winter had the result that there was an excess of import of 800 million kWh; this means that without the four nuclear power plants our country would have had an electric power shortage of nearly 40 percent. The Kaiseraugst plant will not be needed at the beginning of the nineties, as assumed when the basic concept was approved, but only about 4 years later, that is about 1995. However, this calculation would apply only if future winter temperatures remained within certain ranges. Dr E. Kienr also commented on nculear safety, the role of the gas industry within energy policy, and on environmental problems. The most recent research has shown that heat pumps

operated with internal combustion engines, as well as those with thermodynamic coupling, are very energy-efficient. However, with regard to nitrogen oxide emission, they pollute the environment 24-30 times more than conventional boilers. This obviously constitutes a real conflict between the demands of the environment and those of energy policy.

On the whole Dr E. Kiener gave gas a good reference. He stated that the reserves are large, that it can be used economically, and that it is relatively environment-friendly. The Federation therefore welcomes the promising efforts of the gas industry to expand its purchase agreements both in scope and duration, so that by the year 2000 the anticipated annual sales volume of about 2 billion cm would actually be available.

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CSO: 3620/371

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FINLAND, GDR SIGN PACT FOR CONTINUING ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 10 Jul 84 p 8

[Unsigned article: "Finland and East Germany Continue Collaboration"]

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[Text] Cooperation in the field of environmental protection continues between Finland and the German Democratic Republic. This week a conference in Helsinki is planning and developing teamwork between the states. There the subjects of water and air protection, waste treatment, protection of the landscape as well as safeguarding of flora and fauna are beind discussed.

Cooperation in environmental protection takes place within the framework of a mixed economic, scientific/technical and industrial commission between our countries.

Acting as chairman of the GDR's delegation is Karl-Heinz Schroder, chief of the international affairs division of the Ministry for Environmental Protection and Water Management. Olli Ojala from the Ministry of Environment is chairman of Finland's delegation.

12327 CSO: 3617/194

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